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OH, WHAT A TRUISM THE TENTH AMENDMENT IS: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES*
Sharon E. Rush**
Abstract
The United States Supreme Court takes the Tenth Amendment and
state sovereignty seriously. It also takes the Eleventh Amendment and
state sovereign immunity seriously. Moreover, the contemporary Court’s
interpretations of Congress’s Article I powers are based on its
concomitant interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The
Court has infused these interpretations with the idea that an inherent part
of a state’s sovereignty is not just its prerogative not to have its treasuries
invaded, but also includes its right not to have its dignity assaulted.
Protecting the dignity of states and other critical principles that inform
the Court’s Article I, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence have made their way into cases about Congress’s
enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the
Court’s strong coupling of state sovereignty and state sovereign
immunity suggests that they are an inseparable part of the federalism
balance.
This Article explores the development of the contemporary Court’s
strong emphasis on the importance of states as evidenced by its
interpretations at the intersection of Article I and the Tenth, the Eleventh,
and Fourteenth Amendments (the “Intersection”). When all is said and
done, the path to obtaining damage remedies against a state has been
significantly blocked by developments at the Intersection,
notwithstanding Congress’s enforcement power under § 5 to abrogate
states’ immunity. Yet the adequacy of state remedies is largely irrelevant
under § 1983, the primary statute that provides a cause of action for
alleged violations of federal law by state actors. Significantly, though,
almost all state constitutions protect the principle that “where there’s a
right, there must be a remedy.”
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In light of this development, the Court’s message about the
importance of states under Article I and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments does not include a concomitantly strong message about
their importance under the Fourteenth Amendment. To emphasize, this
Article does not attempt to lay out the contours of the role state remedies
can and should play at the Intersection; that is the focus of future
scholarship. Rather, this Article explores the strength and breadth of the
Court’s message about the importance of states under Article I and the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and highlights the curious absence of a
concomitantly strong message about the importance of the states in
protecting individual rights and providing remedies for violations of
those rights. Certainly, if states are important under Article I and the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, they are also important under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Including a message about the importance of
state remedies at the Intersection bolsters the Court’s overall message
about the importance of states in the constitutional design.
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INTRODUCTION
[W]ithout [the independent protective force of state law] the
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.1
The Supreme Court under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and now
Chief Justice Roberts takes the Tenth Amendment2 and state sovereignty
seriously. It also takes the Eleventh Amendment3 and state sovereign
immunity seriously. As this Article explores, the Court has infused the
Eleventh Amendment with Tenth Amendment principles. The
contemporary Court’s strong coupling of state sovereignty and state
sovereign immunity suggests they are an inseparable part of the
federalism4 balance. And while enjoying sovereign immunity is part of a
state’s sovereignty, it does not necessarily follow that because a state is
sovereign, it is always immune. Yet many of the contemporary Court’s
decisions protect state sovereignty—immunizing states from the effects
of federal laws—in ways that extend beyond the traditional
understanding of state sovereign immunity that a state cannot be sued
without its consent.5 This Article refers to this as the Shield.
Additionally, the contemporary Court fortifies the Shield by limiting
Congress’s power under Article I6 and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 Recent developments at the Intersection of Article I and
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
2. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id. amend. XI.
4. Professor Ilya Somin’s definition of federalism describes my use of the term, and I
respectfully quote her: “I focus on constitutional federalism in the narrower sense of judicial
enforcement of structural limits on federal power, usually for the purpose of leaving greater scope
for state and local authority.” Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 441, 442 (2016). How the division of power should be balanced, of course, is
persistently a subject of disagreement. See generally, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court
2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) (arguing for
a view of federalism divorced from the constraints of sovereignty, a national federalism that
recognizes the interdependency of federal and state governments).
5. For an excellent history of sovereign immunity, see generally Calvin R. Massey, State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), which
summarizes the enactment and judicial history of sovereign immunity.
6. I focus primarily on the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause: “The
Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . And To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8.
7. The Fourteenth Amendment contains the following language:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
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the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments (the “Intersection”)
send a strong message about the importance of states in the constitutional
design.8 Simultaneously, the Shield creates a federal void (the “Void”)
by making it virtually impossible for individuals to obtain money
damages from their states under federal law for violations of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights.9 The complexities surrounding efforts to
obtain this remedy because of sovereign immunity and state sovereignty
principles are this Article’s primary focus.10 It is as if the Constitution
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
....
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Id. amend. XIV.
8. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are often characterized as the “federalism” Courts.
See generally Somin, supra note 4 (discussing several cases and issues that have come before the
Roberts Court concerning the issue of federalism). One of the most interesting conceptions of
federalism that is receiving attention is “National Federalism,” which posits that federal/state
relations are increasingly defined by federal regulatory statutes. See generally Abbe R. Gluck,
Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014) (“Federalism today is something
that mostly comes—and goes—at Congress’s pleasure. It is a question, and feature, of federal
statutory design.”). Notwithstanding the source of our “National Federalism,” and consistent with
this Article’s theme, Professor Abbe Gluck also notes that it “depends on, and strengthens, the
states’ continuing sovereign status in important ways that have yet to be recognized.” Id. at 2000.
9. Prominent scholars criticize this development. For an excellent history and critique of
the Court’s § 5 cases, see generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015), which
explored the history of § 5 cases at the Court and argued that the decisions are incoherent,
unpredictable, and illegitimate. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1801, 1809 (2010) (“Increasing congressional power at the expense of the states was the whole
point of the new constitutional structure that followed the Civil War.”); Aviam Soifer, Of Swords,
Shields, and a Gun to the Head: Coercing Individuals, but Not States, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787,
791–92 (2016) (describing the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ view of Congress’s enforcement
power as “crabbed”).
10. Individuals have other federal remedies available, most notably prospective injunctive
relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), enforcement actions brought by the United
States, suits against individual state actors in their personal capacities, and suits against local
governments. See discussion infra notes, 160–65 and accompanying text (discussing Young). See
generally Suits Against State Officials, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment11/04-suits-against-state-officials.html [https://perma.cc/T64B-RMVW] (describing a variety of
available remedies). Obtaining those federal remedies also is becoming increasingly more
difficult in light of the Shield and the Void, but that exploration is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a creative solution to the growing inability of individuals to obtain money damages against
their states, see James E. Pfander & Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State
Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153, 191 (2016), which suggests “a two-step process” for
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can protect only state sovereignty or individual rights, or as Professor
Akhil Amar so eloquently asked years ago, “Is the Constitution therefore
divided against itself?”11
This Article suggests that state remedies can provide a bridge over this
divide and that a critical scene in the bigger picture is largely missing: a
message from the Court about the importance of state remedies.
Occasionally, the Court recognizes the existence of state remedies in § 5
cases.12 But the adequacy of state remedies is largely irrelevant under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the primary statute that provides a cause of action for
alleged violations of federal law by state actors.13 Simultaneously, almost
all state constitutions protect the principle that “[w]here there’s a right,
there must be a remedy.”14
remedying unlawful state action: individuals first seek injunctive relief under Young and then
“pursue their claim [for money damages against the state] through whatever machinery the state
has established.” Their argument, of course, is premised on Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), in
which the Court held that the Supremacy Clause requires states to hear federal claims that are
analogous to the state claims they hear. See id. at 394.
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987).
12. For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Court held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not abrogate states’ immunity, but
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, opined that “[s]tate employees are protected by state
age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost
every State of the Union.” Id. at 91. The Court also considers state remedies in the context of
evaluating whether a state actor has violated due process. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Expense Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999) (holding that patent infringement
by a state is not a due process violation if the state provides a remedy); see also infra Part IV
(discussing the role of state remedies in cases at the Court).
13. See infra Section IV.A (discussing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Chapter 42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
14. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under
Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2004). For an excellent history of state remedies,
see generally Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Tex., The Constitutional Right
to a Remedy, Address at the Justice William J. Brennan Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice
at N.Y.U. School of Law (Feb. 28, 2002), in 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2003). The “rights/remedy”
principle, of course, is famously associated with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803), which states that “where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend
upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” Id. at 166. Interestingly, just
because most states recognize the principle does not mean that an individual will necessarily
receive a remedy under state law. See, e.g., Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies
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To emphasize, this Article does not attempt to lay out the contours of
the role state remedies should play at the Intersection; that is the focus of
future scholarship.15 Rather, this Article explores the strength and breadth
of the Court’s message about the importance of states under Article I and
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and highlights the curious absence
of a concomitantly strong message about the importance of the states in
protecting individual rights and providing remedies for violations of
those rights. To invoke a cliché in the context of the importance of states:
It is as if the Court neglects the states’ forests (remedies) in its protection
of the states’ trees (sovereignty and immunity).
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the contemporary
Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as a substantively
meaningful representation of federalism principles, particularly with
respect to Congress’s Article I powers. Part II analyzes the contemporary
Court’s efforts to define the boundaries between federal and state power,
which eventually resulted in merging Tenth Amendment state
sovereignty principles with Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
principles. Moreover, the contemporary Court’s interpretations of
Congress’s Article I powers are based on its concomitant interpretations
of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The Court has infused these
interpretations with the idea that an inherent part of a state’s sovereignty
is not just its prerogative not to have its treasuries invaded but also
includes its right not to have its dignity assaulted.16 Consistent with
protecting that principle, the Court has held that Congress does not have
power under Article I to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity.17
for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 429 (2018) (“No state court thinks its law guarantees a
personal remedy for every legal wrong. Rather, providing law for the redress of wrongs is a
recognized state interest, even where countervailing concerns may counsel withholding a
remedy.”).
15. This Article is not suggesting that state remedies should be exhausted or even that they
are more important than federal remedies. The development about the scope of state remedies in
light of the Shield and the Void is the focus of future scholarship.
16. For a historical perspective on the role of “dignity” in American jurisprudence, see
generally Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions,
Autonomous Individuals, and the Reluctant Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381
(2011). Professor Erin Daly suggests that the law surrounding the dignity of states can be helpful
in the development of a jurisprudence that protects the dignity of individuals. Id. at 381–82. The
notion that states have dignity, particularly at the expense of individuals, also is criticized. See,
e.g., Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1255 (2016) (noting
that the prohibition on assaulting a state’s dignity suggests it is “entitle[d] . . . to a kind of
unaccountability”). See generally Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003)
(arguing for a narrow recognition of institutional dignity in which the institution may not rely on
dignity to avoid accountability for its actions towards individuals).
17. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996)). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 357 (2006) (noting that
sovereign immunity does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings).
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Part III focuses on the relationships among the states, individuals, and
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of this Part lies
the challenge of understanding the “congruence and proportionality” test
(the “Test”) in City of Boerne v. Flores.18 As a brief overview, the Boerne
Court held that enforcement legislation must be “congruen[t] and
proportional[] [to] the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”19 Although Congress cannot create Fourteenth
Amendment rights, Boerne held that Congress’s enforcement power does
extend to imposing obligations on states to prevent constitutional
violations.20 This is what I call the “Boerne inconsistency,” because
preventive measures function a lot like “rights.”21 Unraveling the
inconsistency and providing a way to understand other complicated
issues raised by the Test is the primary goal of Part III.
Part III demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of § 5 comports
with the Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment principles, particularly
as they relate to protecting states’ dignity. Indeed, protecting the dignity
of states22 and other critical principles that inform the Court’s Article I,
Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence have made
their way into cases about Congress’s enforcement powers under § 5.
This is dramatically illustrated by the Court’s decision in Shelby County
v. Holder,23 which relied on the “equal sovereignty principle” to strike
down the preclearance coverage formula in § 4 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA).24 The contemporary Court uses the analysis in the voting
rights cases as a baseline measurement to evaluate the need for Congress
to use its enforcement power in § 5 cases, none of which raised the equal
sovereignty principle.25 This comparison alone makes it even less likely
that enforcement legislation will meet the Test because of the unique
circumstances surrounding the voting rights of African Americans in the
1960s.26 Thus, injecting the equal sovereignty principle into the analysis
is likely to narrow Congress’s enforcement power and thereby fortify the
Shield and the Void.
18. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 518.
21. See infra Section III.B.3.a.
22. For an excellent critique of the idea that states are imbued with dignity and do not have
to earn it, see Jeremy M. Sher, Note, A Question of Dignity: The Renewed Significance of James
Wilson’s Writings on Popular Sovereignty in the Wake of Alden v. Maine, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 591, 619–25 (2005).
23. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
24. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52
U.S.C.); see Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 544, 557.
25. See cases cited infra note 339.
26. See infra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.
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Simultaneously, when enforcement legislation fails abrogation, it
generally remains valid under Article I, and the analysis circles back (the
“Circling Back Phenomenon”) to this complicated Intersection. Because
Article I is not a source of abrogation,27 however, money damages against
states remain elusive under federal law. Yet when state remedies exist,
they mitigate the Void. Fortunately, as explored in Part IV, state remedies
are beginning to have a presence at the Intersection,28 and a message from
the Court about their importance would be a welcome addition to its
overall message about the importance of states in the constitutional
design.
This Article concludes that when all is said and done, Congress’s
enforcement power is incredibly shallow and is shrinking.29 Unless
Congress takes a seriously more responsive role in exercising its
enforcement power, the people will have to rely increasingly on their
states to help fill in the Void. The challenge of acknowledging and
addressing the Void, while also protecting state sovereignty, should be an
appealing one to scholars, especially to those who accept Dean Heather
Gerken’s challenge to adopt a more integrative understanding of
federal/state relations.30 Certainly, sending a message about the important
positive role states can and should play under the Fourteenth Amendment
would be consistent with and even fortify the Court’s emphasis on the
importance of state sovereignty.
I. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. From Chisholm v. Georgia to the Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court struggled for over two centuries to answer the
question of whether states retained their sovereign immunity when they
adopted the Constitution. Moreover, the primary path the Court has taken
in its search for the answer is the Eleventh Amendment. But what it
means is anything but obvious. On its face, it bars federal courts from
27. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
28. Justice Kennedy focused on the availability of state remedies in his dissenting opinion
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 751–52 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). See discussion infra notes 274–85 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that
state remedies limit or even should limit Congress’s § 5 power or that states must provide
remedies, because that raises commandeering issues. See infra Section IV.B. States also must
abide by federal law under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. This is particularly true after Holder and Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566
U.S. 30 (2012). See discussion infra Section III.B.4.
30. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1697, 1718
(2017) (calling for a “détente between those in the nationalist and federalism camps,” and
encouraging a robust evaluation of how “Our Federalism” can be perfected to reflect today’s
reality that the federal and state governments are uniquely interrelated).
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hearing certain diversity suits brought against a state.31 It was adopted to
overrule the Supreme Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,32 in
which the Court upheld its jurisdiction33 to hear a suit against Georgia for
money damages and rejected Georgia’s defense of sovereign immunity.34
Chisholm was a surprise because sovereign immunity was a defense
at common law, as all of the Chisholm Justices acknowledged.35
Reacting swiftly to overrule Chisholm, states quickly adopted the
Eleventh Amendment in 1798—only five years later. Importantly, to say
that the Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm does not clarify
whether the Amendment means that Article III jurisdiction does not
extend to diversity suits against states or whether it means that states
retained their common law immunity when the Constitution was
ratified.36 Scholars interpret Chisholm in different ways.37 The important
31. See supra note 3 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
32. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI, as recognized in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
33. Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies . . . between a State
and Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. Congress authorized such suits in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
Interestingly, this Act granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over mandamus actions,
which the Court in Marbury v. Madison held was an unconstitutional violation of Article III.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 180 (1803); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)
(authorizing diversity jurisdiction).
34. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419–20. Georgia did not make an appearance but
denied in a written response that the Court had jurisdiction and argued that Article III’s language
should be interpreted to mean only that states can sue as plaintiffs but that they cannot be sued
without their consent because they enjoy immunity. Id. For a thorough and fascinating history of
Chisholm, see Massey, supra note 5, at 98–111. The suit was filed initially in the circuit court in
Georgia and it is unclear whether Justice Iredell, who was riding circuit, dismissed that suit
because he supported Georgia’s sovereign immunity defense or because the Judiciary Act of 1789
did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts. See id. at 99 & n.196. In any event, Chisholm then
sued in the Supreme Court. Id. at 99.
35. See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 442 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
36. Bradford R. Clark & Vicki C. Jackson, Common Interpretation: The Eleventh
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amend
ments/amendment-xi [https://perma.cc/63L9-2MZ5] (“Alarmed by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Chisholm, Senator Caleb Strong, of Massachusetts, quickly proposed an amendment that
ultimately became the Eleventh Amendment.”).
37. Professor Calvin Massey argues that the Eleventh Amendment was a response to a fear
of what Chisholm portended and not what it actually held because the Court never got to decide
the immunity question; it merely held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Massey, supra
note 5, at 102–03. When Georgia failed to make an appearance, Chisholm moved for a default
judgment but the Court gave Georgia almost a year to respond and defend itself. Chisholm, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) at 419. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified and rendered the case moot so
the immunity question was never resolved. Massey, supra note 5, at 103. In contrast, Professor
Amar takes the position that the opinions of the Justices focused on whether an action of assumpsit
would lie against a state in federal court and the majority concluded that it would. Amar, supra
note 11, at 1469. In their opinions, not only did Article III extend jurisdiction over states, but
Professor Amar also notes that the Justices ignored the Rules of Decision Act (part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789) and fell into the Swift v. Tyson general federal common law hole on the assumpsit
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point for this Article is that the Tenth Amendment supports either
interpretation, but none of the Chisholm Justices explicitly mentions it,
although their opinions do dance in its shadows.38 Ironically, Justice
Iredell’s opinion comes closest to invoking the Tenth Amendment: “The
United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers
reserved.”39
question. Id. at 1472 & n.197.
38. The Justices presented their implicit references to the Tenth Amendment as follows.
Justice Blair:
When sovereigns are sued in their own Courts, such a method may have been
established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are not now in a State
Court; and if sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than the
sovereign’s own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the
Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United
States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (emphasis omitted). In Chief Justice Jay’s
oblique reference to the Tenth Amendment, he explicitly listed several powers that were
surrendered to the federal government: “By this great compact however, many prerogatives were
transferred to the national government, such as those of making war and peace, contracting
alliances, coining money, etc. etc.” Id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). Significantly, the “etc. etc.”
is his choice of language. In other words, his explicit list of surrendered powers, and this assumes
the critical diversity jurisdiction phrase in Article III would have made the list, stops short of
invoking the Tenth Amendment. Justice Wilson:
The question now opens fairly to our view, could the people of those States,
among whom were those of Georgia, bind those States, and Georgia among the
others, by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial power so vested? . . . If those
States were the work of those people; those people, and, that I may apply the case
closely, the people of Georgia, in particular, could alter, as they pleased, their
former work: To any given degree, they could diminish as well as enlarge it. Any
or all of the former State-powers, they could extinguish or transfer. The
inference, which necessarily results, is, that the Constitution ordained and
established by those people; and, still closely to apply the case, in particular by
the people of Georgia, could vest jurisdiction or judicial power over those states
and over the State of Georgia in particular.
Id. at 463–64 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted). And, Justice Cushing:
As to individual States and the United States, the Constitution marks the
boundary of powers. Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people
for their own necessary security is so far a curtailing of the power and
prerogatives of States. . . . So that, I think no argument of force can be taken from
the sovereignty of States. Where it has been abridged, it was thought necessary
for the greater indispensable good of the whole.
Id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (emphasis omitted).
39. Id. at 435 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (emphasis omitted). It is unclear whether Justice Iredell
disagreed because he believed states retained their immunity or because he did not think the
Judiciary Act authorized the suit. See Massey, supra note 5, at 107–11 (analyzing the lack of
clarity in Justice Iredell’s dissent).
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Adding to the curious omission of any explicit reference to the Tenth
Amendment is the reality that the Bill of Rights was added to the
Constitution only a few years prior to Chisholm, because the states feared
that they were surrendering too much power to the national government
and adding the Bill of Rights was the quid pro quo for some states’
agreements to ratify the Constitution.40 Given that concern, especially
when coupled with the Chisholm question of whether states surrendered
or retained their sovereign immunity, the Tenth Amendment would have
supported either conclusion.41 So, whither the Tenth Amendment?
B. The Importance of States and the Tenth Amendment
1. Article I: McCulloch v. Maryland
It might seem strange to focus on Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland42 because that case was about Congress’s power
to create a national bank and Maryland’s power to tax it and had nothing
to do with sovereign immunity.43 As Chief Justice Marshall laid out the
boundaries between federal and state power, however, he explicitly relied
on the Tenth Amendment.44 Moreover, McCulloch was decided only
sixteen years after Chisholm and only eleven years after the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, and Chief Justice Marshall’s federalism
boundaries continue to influence, and even divide, Justices on the
contemporary Court—particularly with respect to Congress’s
enforcement power under § 5.
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Congress had the power to
create a national bank and that Maryland did not have the power to tax it,
and he emphasized that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding.”45 Accordingly, Congress must have implied powers to
carry out its explicit ones.46 Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall opined that
40. See generally KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 94 (2d ed. 1996) (“To secure ratification in critical states like Virginia, Federalists
had to promise that they would propose such guarantees [for personal liberty] as amendments to
the Constitution.”).
41. Professor Massey and Professor Amar emphasized this as well. See Amar, supra note
11, at 1491; Massey, supra note 5, at 66 (“The notion of state sovereign immunity . . . and its
constitutional anchor are more properly found in the Tenth Amendment.”).
42. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
43. See id. at 425 (deciding that Congress can create a bank and questioning whether states
shall be allowed to tax the institution).
44. Id. at 406.
45. Id. at 407, 424, 436. Among Congress’s explicit powers that are related to creating a
bank are the “great powers,” including the powers “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to
regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.” Id.
at 407.
46. See id. at 408 (“[I]t may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted
with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation
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Congress’s power is even broader because of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which is not only a limitation on Congress’s power, but it is
actually one of Congress’s enumerated powers.47 In Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion, the Necessary and Proper Clause is like icing on the
congressional power cake. Every first-year law student learns Chief
Justice Marshall’s famous statement: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the [C]onstitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution, are
constitutional.”48
Notwithstanding his support for broad congressional power, Chief
Justice Marshall invoked the Tenth Amendment to acknowledge that the
national government is a government of limited powers and that some
powers are reserved to the states.49 One of the most critical points in his
opinion is the distinction he made between the states and the people. The
Tenth Amendment also makes this distinction, although very little
attention is paid to the words “or to the people.”50 This distinction
explains why Maryland lacked the power to tax the bank. Quoting Chief
Justice Marshall:
The sovereignty of a State extends to [everything] which
exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its
permission; but does it extend to those means which are
employed by Congress to carry into execution powers
conferred on that body by the people of the United States?
We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are
not given by the people of a single State. They are given by
the people of the United States, to a government whose laws,
made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be
supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot
confer a sovereignty which will extend over them.51
Chief Justice Marshall’s distinction between the states and the people,
citing the Tenth Amendment, was the rationale for upholding the
constitutionality of the national bank and Maryland’s lack of power to tax
it. More specifically, McCulloch held that the people are the true
sovereigns and that the states are representatives of the people. The
people of the United States delegated power to Congress to create the
so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.”).
47. See id. at 419–21.
48. Id. at 421.
49. See id. at 406 (“The government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers,
is supreme . . . .”).
50. U.S. CONST. art. X.
51. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 429.
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bank, but they retained their sovereignty as a united people and did not
delegate to Maryland, a single state, the power to tax the national bank.52
This is consistent with James Madison’s views that the liberty of the
people is best protected when governmental power is diffuse.53
Interestingly, all of the Justices in Chisholm noted that the people are
sovereign but, again, without explicitly mentioning the Tenth
Amendment.54 This analysis is relevant to state sovereign immunity and
the Tenth Amendment because the Justices on the Court today are divided
on the question whether Congress’s power under § 5 is plenary as decided
in McCulloch, or whether it is remedial, a more limited standard.55 Also,
the distinction between the states and the people plays a vital role in
understanding how the Test functions and the limitations on Congress’s
§ 5 powers, and this is explored in Part III below.
Finally, McCulloch adds significant insights into Chief Justice
Marshall’s view about the importance of states in the constitutional
design—at least with respect to the relationship between Congress and
the states under Article I. Interestingly, he also acknowledged that “the
question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our
system shall exist.”56 In other words, he suggested that the Tenth
Amendment is a truism and that the “truth” will continue to perpetually
evolve. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch can be interpreted
to mean that states are not that important because the people are the true
sovereigns and they gave Congress broad Article I power.
This seemingly rapid descent of the importance of states and state
sovereignty within a relatively short time after the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment—which was an emphatic response to the
“outrageous assault” on Georgia’s sovereignty in Chisholm—is curious.
Within a span of approximately fifteen critical years because the Court
52. Professor Amar provides an excellent history of the tension (leading up to the Civil
War) between the Anti-Federalists and Republicans, on one side, and the Federalists on the other
side, over the question about who was sovereign under the new Constitution. See Amar, supra
note 11, at 1451–55. Was each state an independent sovereign, the position of the AntiFederalists? See id. at 1452. Or were the people of the United States the sovereign and the states
their representatives, the position of the Federalists? See id.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). The diffusion of power between the
national government and the states is a distinguishing feature of the Constitution compared to the
Articles of Confederation. See Constitution of the United States—A History, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/more-perfect-union [https://perma.cc/U3CV-8MSQ]
(last updated Sept. 25, 2018).
54. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, as recognized in Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
55. See infra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
56. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
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was called upon to interpret significant parts of the Constitution for the
first time, the concept of state sovereignty became clouded with
confusion. How could state sovereignty, including sovereign immunity,
be so important that the Eleventh Amendment was thought necessary to
protect it, but seemingly not so important with respect to defining the
scope of Congress’s Article I powers? Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore57
offers interesting insights.
2. The Bill of Rights: Barron
In Barron, the plaintiff sued Baltimore, alleging that the city58 failed
to maintain the water system, which resulted in damage to his wharfs.59
He alleged that this was an unconstitutional “taking” under the Fifth
Amendment.60 Ironically, Baltimore had consented to being sued so the
issue of immunity was moot. Still, Barron lost.61 Rationalizing that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, the Court had no choice but to
conclude that Barron was not stating a cause of action under the
Constitution.62
Several notable aspects of Barron are worth highlighting. First, and
perhaps most obviously, Barron is an acknowledgement about the
importance of states in the constitutional design. In fact, it might be one
of the Court’s most “emphatic[]” expressions63 of just how important
states are because they were entrusted with protecting individual rights.
The most important rights were those that were included in the Bill of
Rights because the people wanted to be sure those rights were protected
from violation by the federal government. But the people (excluding the
slaves, of course) did not have to fear that their own state governments
57. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
58. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court
held that cities are “persons” under § 1983 and can be sued for money damages but only when
local state actors act pursuant to an invalid policy. Id. at 690, 694. Monell overruled Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. at 663, which held that Congress did
not intend for cities to be sued under § 1983 because they enjoyed sovereign immunity. Monell,
436 U.S. at 658 n.59, 664, 700.
59. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 243–44.
60. Id. at 246; see also Note, Reconciling State Sovereign Immunity with the Fourteenth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1070, 1078 (2016) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment is self-executing and abrogates states’ immunity for “takings” and tax refund cases).
61. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 251.
62. See id. at 250–51. It gets even more complicated in light of contemporary jurisprudence.
For example, cities are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690
n.54. Further, suppose that the Bill of Rights had applied to the states at the time of Barron in
1833—before the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 and even § 1331’s general “arising under”
jurisdiction enacted in 1875. Barron still would have needed a cause of action, raising questions
about implied right of actions under the Constitution, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
63. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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would violate such important rights. By not applying the Bill of Rights to
limit state power, the Court affirmed that the people could in fact trust
their states not to violate their rights.
Viewing McCulloch and Barron with hindsight is informative. In the
bigger picture, McCulloch downplayed the importance of states with
respect to Congress’s Article I power, but Barron emphasized the
importance of states with respect to protecting individual rights. And
these messages emanated from Chief Justice Marshall within a relatively
short historical time period that included Chisholm, adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment, and Marbury v. Madison.64 Together, the
messages provide a map for understanding where Chief Justice Marshall
thought the boundaries between national and state power should be, and
in significant ways that map is charting the contemporary Court’s
federalism path.
Poignantly, and supportive of this Article’s theme, Chief Justice
Marshall’s messages in McCulloch and Barron echo with remarkable
similarity those from the contemporary Court but with two significant
exceptions. As explored below in Section I.C, the messages are the same
with respect to acknowledging that Congress’s power is plenary under
Article I. Unlike Chief Justice Marshall, however, the contemporary
Court limits Congress’s plenary power by articulating and relying on
Tenth Amendment principles. The Court’s primary message is to
reestablish and reaffirm the importance of states in the constitutional
design, including under Article I. The contemporary Court’s revival of
the Tenth Amendment is huge as evidenced by the strength of the Shield.
The second exception stands in sharp contrast. Unlike the Barron
Court, the contemporary Court is not sending a correspondingly loud
message about the importance of states in protecting individual liberties.
Admittedly, federal–state relations dramatically changed following the
Civil War and adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, and the
Court post-Barron has incorporated most of the Bill of Rights to apply to
the states.65 Even the contemporary Court recently incorporated the
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.66 But the Court’s fierce respect
for the Shield and seeming disregard for the Void raises the question of
whether the Court is functioning as if federal–state relations are returning
to a Barron-like time in the sense that states can be trusted again.67 If so,
then more can and should be expected of states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. If states do provide remedies and mitigate the federal
remedy Void, then failing to recognize their efforts to fulfill the Marbury
64.
65.
66.
67.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See infra notes 380–82 and accompanying text.
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
See infra Section III.B.4.a.
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rights–remedy principle,68 which recall most states also have in their own
constitutions,69 is a missed opportunity for the contemporary Court to
strengthen its message about the importance of states and state
sovereignty.
C. The Tenth Amendment
1. It Is a Truism
Chief Justice Marshall’s suggestion in McCulloch that the Tenth
Amendment is a “truism” is significant because of the context in which
he and subsequent Courts use that description. In McCulloch, Chief
Justice Marshall did not invoke the Tenth Amendment as a reminder that
federal power is limited; he noted that the Constitution’s interpretation
“depend[ed] on a fair construction of the whole instrument.”70 In context,
his admonition augurs in favor of reading the Constitution to give
Congress broad power. He opined that unless Congress legislates under
a pretext, its power is essentially unlimited.71
Since McCulloch, different Courts have interpreted the scope of
Congress’s power differently, particularly its Commerce Clause power,
one of the most important clauses defining federalism boundaries. By
manipulating the definition of commerce (excluding mining72 and
manufacturing,73 for example), different Courts operated on the premise
that Congress’s Commerce Clause power and states’ retained powers
under the Tenth Amendment were inversely related.74
The concept of the Tenth Amendment being a truism was first used in
McCulloch to justify broad congressional power. Interestingly, it was
used in United States v. Darby,75 decided in 1941, for the same purpose—
to justify reestablishing the broad scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
68. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (“But where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the
individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy.”).
69. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
70. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
71. Id. at 423.
72. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) (concluding that coal
mining is not considered to be part of commerce).
73. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1895) (concluding that
antitrust laws do not extend to a sugar company because commerce does not include the
manufacturing of sugar).
74. Interestingly, this same conception of the relationship between Congress and the states
existed under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. Specifically, the idea that federal power is
“carved out of” power that was reserved to the states comes from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1879). See infra Part III (exploring this power).
75. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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power compared to the previous Court.76 In upholding the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),77 which
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods that were
manufactured by workers in violation of the Act’s minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions, the Darby Court held that Congress’s
Commerce Clause power is plenary. The Court stated, “[f]rom the
beginning and for many years the [Tenth A]mendment has been
construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort
to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate
and plainly adapted to the permitted end.”78
The Darby Court cited Gibbons v. Ogden,79 the case in which Chief
Justice Marshall first described Congress’s broad Commerce Clause
power and held that it extends to activities within a state that affect
another state.80 In light of Darby, Wickard v. Filburn81 perhaps came as
no surprise. Wickard held that Congress had the power to impose a
penalty on farmers who grew wheat in excess of their allotments under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.82 This was true even though
farmer Filburn used his excess wheat to feed his family and his
livestock.83 It did not matter. The Court held: “But even if appellee’s
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.”84 To emphasize just how broad
Congress’s power extended, the Court added: “That appellee’s own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough
to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
is far from trivial.”85
Critically, for the McCulloch and Darby Courts to label the Tenth
Amendment a “truism” says nothing about what “truth” it represents.
Those Courts invoked the saying to suggest that state power is not very

76. Specifically, in Darby, the Supreme Court explicitly referred to the Tenth Amendment
as a truism because it is “declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments.” Id. at 124.
77. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012)); see Darby, 312 U.S. at 125.
78. Darby, 312 U.S. at 109, 124.
79. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see Darby, 312 U.S. at 113.
80. See Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 30.
81. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
82. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1407 (2012));
see Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114, 125 (describing that though the farmer’s allotment was 11.1 acres,
he farmed 23 acres) (holding that the farmer’s activities could be regulated by Congress).
83. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
84. Id. at 125.
85. Id. at 127–28.
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significant, enabling the Courts to “dismiss” the importance of states
under Article I in finding the “true” federalism balance.
2. Oh, What a Truism It Is
In contrast, the contemporary Court has developed an understanding
of the limited nature of Congress’s Article I powers such that the idea that
states have reserved powers is meaningful. To the contemporary Court,
the Tenth Amendment commands the respect of the states. To highlight
this shift in the search for the “truth” behind the Tenth Amendment, this
phrase is interesting: “The Tenth Amendment is a truism, but, oh, what a
truism it is.”
Unlike earlier Courts that limited Congress’s power by narrowing the
definition of commerce, the contemporary Court adopted the same
definition of commerce used in Wickard: Congress has the power to
regulate the channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, persons and things in interstate commerce, and
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.86 The Court also
functions on an extremely broad interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. For example, in Comstock v. United States,87 the Court
upheld Congress’s power to civilly commit certain sexual offenders after
they had already served their federal sentences.88
Notwithstanding the broad scope of Congress’s Article I power, the
contemporary Court has limited Congress’s power in three ways. First, it
invoked the anti-commandeering principle embodied in the Tenth
Amendment as a structural limitation on federal power. Second, it
provided limiting principles to the broad definition of commerce,
particularly with respect to the “substantially affects” prong of that
definition. Finally, by building on those two limitations of Congress’s
power, the Court definitively answered “yes” to the lingering question of
whether states retained their sovereign immunity when they adopted the
Constitution. As developed below, the Court’s three attacks on
Congress’s broad power under Article I are closely related, but also
significantly different. The bottom line, though, is they work together to
fortify the Shield and lay the groundwork for limiting Congress under § 5.

86. E.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16, 17 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558–59 (1995).
87. 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
88. Id. at 129, 131.
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a. The Anti-Commandeering Principle89
This principle provided the core rationale in three Tenth Amendment
cases that required states to follow Congress’s directives as provided in
federal statutes: New York v. United States,90 Printz v. United States,91
and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.92 In New
York, Congress required states to take title to radioactive waste materials
they could not dispose of at dump sites.93 In Printz, Congress likewise
required state law enforcement personnel to conduct background checks
on gun purchasers until the underlying federal regulatory program could
be staffed with federal officials.94 In Sebelius, Congress required states to
expand their Medicaid coverage or lose federal funding for existing
Medicaid programs.95
In all three cases, the Court emphasized the Constitution’s structural
limitations on Congress’s power, as symbolized by the Tenth
Amendment.96 Specifically, the New York Court held, “While Congress
has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas
of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress’s instructions.”97
The Court cited to Darby for the proposition that the Tenth
Amendment is a truism,98 but notice that the Court invoked the phrase in
the sense of “Oh, what a truism it is.” The “truth” the contemporary Court
relies on is that the Tenth Amendment protects states under the “anticommandeering principle,” which prohibits the federal government from

89. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1551–56 (2000) (discussing the anticommandeering principle and the Commerce Clause).
90. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
91. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
92. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
93. New York, 505 U.S. at 150–51.
94. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902. In 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by
passing the Brady Act, which required the Attorney General to create a national background check
system for gun purchasers. Id. While the federal program was being put into place, the Act
required state and local law enforcement to conduct the background checks. Id. at 904. Chief law
enforcement officers from two different states objected to this requirement and challenged
Congress’s power. Id.
95. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 542. It also required individuals to purchase health insurance under
the Individual Mandate provisions. Id. at 539. For further discussion of Sebelius, see infra notes
107–12 and accompanying text.
96. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24;
New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
97. New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
98. Id. at 156.
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compelling states to administer federal regulatory programs.99 The Printz
Court added illustrative Tenth Amendment language:
Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all
governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones,
Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered express by the
Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.100
Compared to the previous Court, the contemporary Court was quickly
turning the “dismissive” truism into the “respectful” truism.
The Court’s second primary message supporting state sovereignty
harkens back to one of the critical aspects of understanding the scope of
state sovereign immunity: distinguishing between the states and the
people. Specifically, the New York Court reiterated, drawing on the
Framers’ intent as evidenced in the Federalist Papers, the established
principle that the federal government has power to regulate individuals
but not states.101
In providing for a stronger central government,
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States. . . . We have always understood that even where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass
laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts.102
Notably, the Printz Court protected state sovereignty and
simultaneously cited to Alexander Hamilton, stressing the importance of
distinguishing between the states, the people, and the shared power the
states and the federal governments have over the people: “Framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and
Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the

99. See, e.g., id. at 188 (“The Constitution instead ‘leaves to the several States a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty’ . . . .” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison))).
100. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
101. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
102. Id. (emphasis added).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1

1116

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

people—who were, in Hamilton’s words, ‘the only proper objects of
government.’”103
New York and Printz are powerful states’ rights cases because there is
no question that the radioactive waste or the guns were in commerce—
under a definition as broad as that used in Wickard104—and still the Court
limited Congress’s power and gave substantive meaning to the Tenth
Amendment. Indeed, the anti-commandeering principle carried the day
in Sebelius,105 the more recent case about the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).106
Although Sebelius is a little bit different from New York and Printz, it
adds a walloping boost to state sovereignty. Sebelius presented two
issues: (1) whether Congress has the Commerce Clause power to require
individuals to buy health insurance (the “Individual Mandate”) and (2)
whether Congress has the power to require states to expand Medicaid or
lose existing federal funding (the “Medicaid Expansion”).107 This Article
explores the Individual Mandate provision below, but note here that the
Court held that it violated the Commerce Clause108 but not the Taxing
and Spending Clause.109 The important point here is that the Court held
that the Medicaid Expansion was unconstitutional because it violated the
anti-commandeering principle.110 Moreover, the Court cited to both New
York and Printz in support of its holding.111 In fact, the language Chief
Justice Roberts used in Sebelius dramatically makes the point that
Congress cannot coerce states to participate in federal regulatory
programs by putting “a gun to the[ir] head[s].”112
b. The “Substantially Affects” Prong of Commerce
The second method of protecting state sovereignty by limiting
Congress’s Article I powers focuses on the “substantially affects
interstate commerce” prong of the broad definition of commerce. United
States v. Lopez113 provides a solid starting point to begin the analysis. In
103. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)).
104. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (“But even if [an] activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .”).
105. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (plurality opinion).
106. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 530.
107. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 530–32, 572.
108. See id. at 561 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
109. See id. at 574 (majority opinion).
110. See id. at 585.
111. Id. at 577.
112. Id. at 581.
113. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Lopez, the Court addressed the question of whether Congress has the
power to make possession of guns near schools a federal crime.114
Critically, the Lopez Court affirmed that the correct definition of
commerce is the same one used in Darby.115 To be within Congress’s
Commerce Clause power, then, the law had to regulate an activity that
has a “‘substantial effect’ on interstate commerce.”116 At this juncture in
its opinion, the Court highlighted that possession of a gun is not even
economic activity.117 And while the Court noted that it was not necessary
for Congress to present evidence that Lopez’s gun actually had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the absence of such evidence
was noteworthy to the Court.118
The highlighted words or phrases identify critical issues that divide
the Justices even today. Ironically, it was not until Sebelius that the idea
that Congress could regulate only an “activity” became crystal clear.
This, of course, arose in the context of the Individual Mandate and the
requirement that a person has to buy health insurance under the ACA or
face a penalty.119 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that Congress’s
power to regulate commerce extends only to activities. Not buying health
insurance is inactivity and, therefore, not even in commerce.120
Prior to Sebelius, the cases the Court reviewed in this area focused on
the other two highlighted phrases: “economic activity” and “actually in
commerce.” For example, in United States v. Morrison,121 the Court held
that Congress does not have power under Article I to provide a civil
remedy for women who are the victims of violence because, among other
reasons, committing acts of violence is not “economic activity.”122
Moreover, it is clear following Sebelius that to meet the “substantially

114. Id. at 551–52. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat.
4844, invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1997) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22
(2012)), made it a federal crime “knowingly to possess a firearm” near a school. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(2)(A).
115. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
116. Id. at 557 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941)).
117. Id. at 561–62. Moreover, the law was not even limited to a subset of guns that have
some connection to interstate commerce. Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 562–63.
119. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 539 (2012).
120. Id. at 551–52, 558 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
121. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
122. Id. at 613–14, 613 n.5 (striking down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
Congress also lacked power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide a civil remedy
for domestic violence victims who are harmed by private people. See id. at 621–22; see also infra
Section III.A (describing the state action requirement that limits the Fourteenth Amendment).
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affects” prong of the definition of commerce, the federal law must
regulate economic activity.123
c. The “Actual Evidence” Prong of Commerce
As for the “actual evidence” issue, the law remains uncertain and the
Justices are split on what standard to apply. Does Congress need actual
evidence that the economic activity substantially affects commerce?
Alternatively, is it sufficient that Congress has a rational basis for
concluding that an economic activity substantially affects commerce? If
actual evidence is required, Congress’s power is more limited and the
Court plays a larger role in limiting Congress’s power. Presumably, a
federalist Court would prefer this. On the other hand, if the standard is
that Congress simply needs a rational basis for concluding that an
economic activity substantially affects commerce, then there is little need
for the Court to review Commerce Clause legislation to see if it meets the
test.124
This issue marked the turning point for the different outcomes in
Lopez and Gonzales v. Raich.125 In Raich, the Court upheld Congress’s
power to make possession of medical marijuana a crime.126 In Lopez, the
Court was concerned about the absence of congressional findings that
possession of guns in school zones actually had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce because that conclusion “was [not] visible to the
naked eye.”127 In their concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor emphasized that the Court has a responsibility to ensure that
Congress respects two more essential postulates about state sovereignty:
(1) that states are supposed to be laboratories for experimenting with their
own ideas about what should be regulated and how it should be regulated,
and forty states had already criminalized possession of guns near
schools,128 and (2) there are areas of traditional state concern, like
education, that are reserved for the states to regulate.129 Note how the
“labs of experimentation” and “areas of traditional state concern”
principles fit neatly into Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and are
articulable standards for defining the boundary between national and state
power.

123. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 551 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
124. This issue also arises in the context of Congress’s § 5 power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra Part III.
125. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
126. See id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
127. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995).
128. See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 583.
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This issue about whether Congress needs “actual” evidence also is at
the heart of the dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer in Lopez.130 In fact, Justice Breyer’s dissent cites to studies that
present empirical evidence about the effects of guns in schools on
interstate commerce.131 But the important point all of the dissenting
Justices highlight is the limited role the Court should play in evaluating
the constitutionality of the federal law.132 All that is required for the law
to be constitutional, in their opinions, is that it was rational for Congress
to conclude that possession of guns near schools has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.133
The Raich majority (the Lopez dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and
Scalia) concluded that the regulation of drugs is “quintessentially
economic” activity.134 But, unlike in Lopez, the Raich majority found that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that possession of medical
marijuana has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and emphasized
the Court’s limited role: “[W]e stress that the task before us is a modest
one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”135
Teaching Lopez and Raich is challenging because it is not easy to
understand the different outcomes.136 The Court uses the same broad
definition of commerce in both cases.137 It cites to Wickard and Darby
with approval in both cases.138 The outcomes are different, however,
because of this open issue about what the standard is that controls the
“substantially affects” prong. Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined the
130. See id. at 603 & n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 619 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
132. See id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 616–17
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 565 (majority opinion); id. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
135. Id. at 22 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). Interestingly, Justice Scalia concurred to
provide the sixth vote to uphold the law. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring). In his concurrence,
he also relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause and even opined that Congress’s power extends
to the regulation of noneconomic intrastate activity if not regulating it would undercut a national
market. See id. at 34–35. He also has unique views about the scope of Congress’s § 5 powers,
discussed infra Section III.B.4.b.
136. I distinctly remember asking my Constitutional Law class in 1995 when we studied
Lopez: “Do you think the Court would rule the same way if Lopez violated a federal law that made
it a crime to possess marijuana?” The buzz around the room suggested that I had asked a silly
question. After all, possession is possession; it does not matter what is possessed. Of course, I felt
the same way, but I also thought the question was kind of silly because I never imagined the Court
would grant certiorari in such a case.
137. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 16, 17; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
138. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 9, 17–20, 29; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555–56.
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majority in Raich for a relatively rare 6–3 vote in cases in this area.139 As
explored in Part III, the scope of Congress’s Article I power engenders a
similar disagreement in the § 5 cases and also is vital to the effect of
federal laws that circle back to the Intersection because they fail under
the Fourteenth Amendment. If such laws are valid under Article I, then at
least states can be held to federal standards.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AND TENTH AMENDMENT
STATE SOVEREIGNTY MERGE
Around the time of New York, Printz, and Lopez, the Court also
decided Seminole Tribe v. Florida140 and Alden v. Maine.141 In fact, these
cases were all decided within seven years of each other, with Morrison,
Comstock, and Raich right on their heels. Seminole Tribe and Alden join
the state sovereignty revival in perhaps one of the most significant ways:
they clarify the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment by relying on Tenth
Amendment principles.
To appreciate the full import of Seminole Tribe and Alden, however,
it is important to include Hans v. Louisiana142 and Ex parte Young.143
Decided almost a century after Chisholm, the Hans Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment also bars federal-question suits against nonconsenting states in federal court.144 At the time of Chisholm and the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, there is logic in the observation
that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to bar diversity suits because
it was “correcting” Chisholm’s error and also because general “arising
under” jurisdiction did not exist until 1875.145 Nevertheless, despite its
literal language, the Hans Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
represents the principle of sovereign immunity embedded in the common
law prior to adoption of the Constitution.146
Hans added to the confusion left in the wake of Chisholm and the
wording of the Eleventh Amendment because it did not answer the
question of whether the Amendment restored common law immunity or
whether it established a subject matter jurisdiction bar—to just diversity
suits or even to federal question suits.147 Depending on the answer,
139. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 3–4.
140. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
141. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
142. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
143. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
144. Hans, 134 U.S. at 18–19.
145. See id. at 5, 6, 9, 18.
146. See id. at 13.
147. See generally William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989) (discussing the various theories
surrounding the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and how such interpretations would alter
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Congress’s power would be affected; a common law rule invited
Congress to possibly abrogate a state’s immunity, whereas a subject
matter jurisdiction bar meant that Congress could not open the Article III
gates through ordinary legislation.
The Hans Court’s reasoning that state sovereign immunity is an
essential ingredient of state sovereignty laid the perfect foundation for the
contemporary Court’s decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden. Focusing
on Seminole Tribe, the case raised the question of whether Congress has
the power under Article I’s Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity, which Congress clearly intended to do in the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act.148 The case arose because the Seminole Tribe
sued Florida in federal court when its Governor refused to negotiate with
the Tribe as required by the Act.149 Florida successfully raised the defense
of sovereign immunity.150
The Court held in a 5–4 decision that Congress lacks abrogation
power under the Indian Commerce Clause.151 In its reasoning, the Court
reviewed the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,152 in
which that Court held that Congress does have abrogation power under
the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article I.153 By considering both
Article I Clauses in its opinion, the Seminole Tribe Court relied on the
sovereign immunity principle embedded in Hans to declare that Congress
does not have power under either Clause to abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity.154 Significantly, the Court affirmed that the Amendment does
not mean what it says: “Although the text of the Amendment would
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it
confirms.’”155
the breadth of Congress’s power). Professor William Baude recently presented a persuasive
argument that sovereign immunity is a special common law rule that is part of the constitutional
backdrop such that it cannot be changed. See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017). From this view, Hans was correctly decided.
148. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2486 (1988) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–68 (2012) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012)); see Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57, 60 (1996).
149. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51–52.
150. See id. at 47.
151. Id. at 46–47.
152. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66; see Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 59–66 (analyzing Union Gas).
153. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion).
154. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, 68–70. But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S.
356, 359 (2006) (determining that sovereign immunity does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings).
155. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (alteration in original) (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
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What is that presupposition? It is that states are sovereign and that an
“inherent” part of their sovereignty is their immunity from suit without
their consent.156
Critically important, the Seminole Tribe Court left no doubt that states
retained their immunity when they ratified the Constitution. Relying on
Hans, the Court said, “[f]or over a century we have reaffirmed that federal
jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated
by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United
States.’”157 To phrase this more poignantly, at long last, the contemporary
Court clarified that the Eleventh Amendment presents a constitutional bar
to suits against non-consenting states in federal court and Congress
cannot alter that using its Article I powers.158 Accordingly, it overruled
Union Gas and held that Florida enjoyed immunity from suit.159
Seminole Tribe is further significant because the Court rejected the
application of its prior decision in Ex parte Young, decided in 1908. In
Young, Minnesota enacted a law regulating railroad rates that a federal
court ruled was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and
enjoined Edward T. Young, Minnesota Attorney General, from enforcing
the law.160 Undeterred, Young sought relief in state court, and the federal
court held him in contempt.161
In Young, the Supreme Court faced a challenging question: If Young
was essentially the state of Minnesota and therefore enjoyed immunity,
how was the supremacy of federal law going to be protected?162 Cleverly,
the Court held that Young acted without state authority when he tried to
enforce an unconstitutional law and therefore was not the state and did
not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.163 Simultaneously, the Court
held that he was a state actor, albeit acting unlawfully, for purposes of the
state action doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment.164 This opening
enabled the Court to allow prospective injunctive relief against Young
and against state actors more generally.165 The availability of Young relief
respects the Eleventh Amendment and also the Fourteenth Amendment
by enabling courts to protect the supremacy of federal law by enjoining
state actors from continuing to violate federal law. Young relief also plays
a pivotal role in the Circling Back Phenomenon as a way to hold states to
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
See id. at 72–73.
See id. at 66, 76.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 127, 148, 162 (1908).
See id. at 126. The Supreme Court reviewed his writ of habeas corpus. Id.
See id. at 142.
See id. at 159–60.
See id. at 160–63. See generally infra Section III.A (discussing state action doctrine).
Young, 209 U.S. at 161–62, 166.
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federal standards when abrogation fails under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Thus, in Seminole Tribe, when Florida’s Governor did not negotiate
with the Seminole Tribe, it sought to enjoin him under Young.166 The
Court, however, held that Young relief was unavailable because Congress
had provided a comprehensive remedial scheme in the Act and had not
listed injunctive relief among the possible remedies.167 This is important
because the Court established the Young doctrine almost ninety years
earlier and it could have reasonably presumed it was available because
Congress did not exclude it. Instead, the Court presumed that Congress
intended for it to be unavailable by not including it.168 Arguably, this
protects separation of powers principles, but, more significantly, it
strengthens the Shield.169
Interestingly, the Seminole Tribe Court did not explicitly rely on the
Tenth Amendment, but the decision fits perfectly into the contemporary
Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. This becomes crystal clear in
Alden, decided only three years later, because Alden raised the same
question the Court decided in Seminole Tribe: whether Congress has the
power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity using its Article I
powers.170 Significantly, though, Alden was a suit in state court against
Maine to recover wages allegedly due to state probation officers under
FLSA.171 The Eleventh Amendment, on its face, does not apply in state
court. Moreover, even the decision in Seminole Tribe interpreted the
Amendment as a complete subject matter jurisdiction bar to suits for
money damages against non-consenting states by private parties in
federal court.172
Given the contemporary Court’s coupling of state sovereignty
principles embedded in the Tenth Amendment with the principle of state
sovereign immunity embedded in the Eleventh Amendment, it is not
surprising that the Alden Court applied those Tenth Amendment
166. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1996).
167. See id. at 53, 73–74.
168. See id. at 73–74.
169. For a critique of Seminole Tribe’s holding on the Young relief issue, see generally Vicki
C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte
Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997), which argued that the Court’s limitation of federal courts
in Seminole Tribe is inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison and the federal courts’ role in
enforcing federal law against uncooperative states. Significantly, the Court held in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), that state officials cannot be
enjoined in federal court on state law issues. Id. at 124–25.
170. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
171. See id. at 711–12. The suit was originally filed in federal court, but when Seminole Tribe
was handed down, the federal court dismissed it because Maine enjoyed sovereign immunity and
Congress lacked the power to abrogate it. See id. Hopeful, the Alden plaintiffs filed their suit in
Maine state court. Id. at 712. Recall that the Darby Court upheld Congress’s Commerce Clause
power to enact FLSA. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
172. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58.
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principles to protect Maine from the suit in its own courts. Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Alden explicitly rests on the Tenth
Amendment:
We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States’
immunity from suit as “Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
The phrase is . . . something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification
of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either
literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon
an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by
the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.
. . . Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the
States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth
Amendment . . . .173
Alden follows logically from the contemporary Court’s Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and the opinion is infused with
reliance on and citations to principles at the hearts of those decisions,
particularly Seminole Tribe.174 States’ immunity from money damages
not only protects their coffers (the traditional understanding of
immunity), but it also protects their independent policy decision-making
(dignity).175 The Alden Court even intimates that allowing suits under
federal law (enacted under Article I, at least) for money damages against
states—in either federal or state courts—without their consent, would
violate the anti-commandeering principle.176 The Court explicitly
suggests it would confuse political accountability lines,177 much like the
take-title provision of the federal law in New York and the background
check provision in Printz—two Tenth Amendment bulwark cases.178
173. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. Notice that this is the original understanding of the principle of
equal sovereignty among the states, which is different from the way in which Shelby County used
it. See infra Section III.B.4.a.
174. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.15).
175. See id. at 750.
176. See id. at 749.
177. See id. at 751.
178. See supra Section I.C.2 (discussing the current state of the Tenth Amendment in the
law).
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But the Alden Court was not just concerned about protecting states’
coffers. Its opinion emphasizes that states enjoy a constitutional
immunity from having their dignity assaulted.179 The Court opined,
“[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants
in the governance of the Nation.”180 The rhetoric the Court associates
with protecting a state’s dignity is akin to the choice of words one might
use when an individual’s dignity is impugned. For example, the Court
held that subjecting a non-consenting state to suit for money damages is
“[not] becoming,”181 “offensive,”182 “denigrat[ing],”183 and, of course,
disrespectful of a state’s inherent sovereignty.184
Finally, a significant portion of the majority’s opinion is devoted to
refuting Justice Souter’s dissent185 because he continued to rely on the
diversity jurisdiction interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.186 It is
as if the majority is signaling that they are tired of talking about what the
Eleventh Amendment means and are ready to “put to bed” any lingering
questions about the scope of state sovereignty,187 especially with respect
to state sovereign immunity and the full scope of how the Constitution’s
history and structure protect states, not just from monetary judgments
against their will, but, quite significantly, also from assaults to their
dignity in the constitutional design.
To briefly summarize, the contemporary Court protects states and
their sovereignty from the effects of federal law in ways that extend
beyond the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity. This is
apparent from the Court’s focus on protecting states’ dignity in a broad
sense that extends beyond protecting their treasuries. With the merger of
179. Alden, 527 U.S. at 748–49.
180. Id. at 748.
181. Id. (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
182. Id. at 749.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 748–49 (“The principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional
design ‘thus accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation.’” (quoting
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993))). For a
comprehensive critical analysis of the value of dignity-based claims of individuals, see generally
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims,
69 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
185. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 724–27.
186. See id. at 793 n.29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
187. The Court also seems tired of this battle in the context of sovereign immunity and
Congress’s abrogation power under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, opined, “Indeed, the present
dissenters’ refusal to accept the validity and natural import of decisions like Hans, rendered over
a full century ago by this Court, makes it difficult to engage in additional meaningful debate on
the place of state sovereign immunity in the Constitution.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 79–80 (2000); see also infra notes 390–93 and accompanying text (discussing Kimel).
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the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Shield is securely in place and
ready to protect states from a coercive or disrespectful Congress. Notably,
the Court relies on Alden in almost all of the § 5 cases discussed below
even though those cases were filed in federal court.188 Such reliance is
evidence that the Court intends to infuse the § 5 cases with the basic
sovereignty and immunity principles that led up to and supported its
decision in Alden.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CONGRESS,
STATES, AND INDIVIDUALS
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individual rights and explicitly
limits state power.189 Section 1 provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.190
Congress has power under § 5 to enforce the Amendment through
“appropriate legislation.”191 Before analyzing some of the confusing
issues raised by § 5, two significant issues are clear. First, in 1976 in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,192 a unanimous Court193 held that § 5 is a source of
abrogation.194 Second, the Fitzpatrick Court also held that Congress’s
enforcement power diminished what had previously been reserved to the
states and that “[s]uch enforcement is no invasion of State
sovereignty.”195 The Fitzpatrick Court relied on a line of cases beginning
188. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79–80.
189. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 5.
192. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
193. See id. at 446. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, id. at 447, but he was not elevated
to Chief Justice until 1986, Death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, 545 U.S. XI, XII (2005), and
Fitzpatrick was decided in 1976.
194. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447–48, 456 (finding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 successfully abrogated a state’s sovereign immunity when male plaintiffs sued their current
or former employer, the State of Connecticut, for money damages alleging that it discriminated
against them on the basis of sex).
195. Id. at 454–55 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). Professor William
D. Araiza raises the question of whether the anti-commandeering principle would limit Congress’s
enforcement power and suggests it would not, pointing out the significant intrusion into state
sovereignty under the VRA. ARAIZA, supra note 9, at 4. Requiring states to provide remedies
would violate the anti-commandeering principle, which became prominent at the Intersection after
New York, Printz, and Sebelius and also Shelby County. Subjecting states to potential money
damages under federal law is different from “forcing” states to provide remedial schemes. Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor note this distinction in their concurring opinion in Board of Trustees of
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in 1880 with Ex parte Virginia,196 which even the contemporary Court
continues to cite with approval.197 Notwithstanding this simple “truth,”
however, Congress’s enforcement power is incredibly shallow and
arguably is shrinking, as explored below.198 However, this development
is consistent with the “oh, what a truism it is” understanding of the Tenth
Amendment.
The critical key to successful abrogation and also not violating the
Tenth Amendment is that the legislation must be valid, and therein lies
the seeds for confusion. Generally, Fourteenth Amendment legislation is
invalid if it fails to meet the state action requirement199 or if it fails the
Test.200 Moreover, there are aspects of these two reasons that overlap and
contribute to the confusion, but the following analysis demonstrates that
they are integral parts of the development of the law surrounding the
Shield, the Void, and the Circling Back Phenomenon.
A. The State Action Requirement as a Fourteenth
Amendment Limitation
In the Civil Rights Cases201 (CRC), the Court interpreted § 1 and § 5
to mean that Congress lacked power under § 5 to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1875202 to prohibit race discrimination in “all inns, public
conveyances, and places of amusement.”203 Emphasizing the Tenth
Amendment, the Court held that without state action,204 there can be no
Fourteenth Amendment violation.205 The Court rejected Justice Harlan’s
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See
infra notes 306–14 and accompanying text (giving a fuller discussion of Garrett).
196. 100 U.S. 339 (1880); see Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (“There can be no doubt that this
line of cases [from Ex pare Virginia to Mitchum v. Foster] has sanctioned intrusions by Congress,
acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded
on the expansion of Congress’ powers—with the corresponding diminution of state
sovereignty . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004).
198. See infra Section III.B.4.
199. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10–11 (1883).
200. See infra Section III.B (describing and analyzing the Test).
201. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
202. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
203. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10, 18.
204. The “citizenship clause” of the Amendment does not have a state action requirement; it
overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and made the newly freed slaves citizens. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. For a persuasive argument that protecting equal citizenship of individuals does
not require state action, see Balkin, supra note 9, at 1833. See id. (“To prevent some Americans
from being relegated to a second-class form of citizenship, Congress may—and indeed must—
reach private as well as public activity.”).
205. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 14–15, 17.
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opinion that the state’s failure to protect people from private
discrimination was, in essence, state action.206 Critically, the CRC Court
explicitly left open the question of whether the Commerce Clause would
be a valid source of power to sustain the 1875 Civil Rights Act.207
Eighty-one years later, critical issues raised by the 1883 CRC
reappeared at the Intersection of two iconic cases—Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States208 and Katzenbach v. McClung.209 At issue
was the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,210 which—like
the 1875 Act—prevented private businesses from discriminating on the
basis of race in public accommodations.211 The 1964 Act was enacted
pursuant to Congress’s power under both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment.212 While the CRC Court left the Commerce
Clause question open,213 the Heart of Atlanta Court upheld the 1964 Act
under the Commerce Clause and explicitly left open whether it was
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.214
In 1964, then, the Court intimated that Congress’s § 5 enforcement
power might authorize legislation like the 1964 Act—even though the
1964 Act prohibited the same conduct as the 1875 Act that was struck
down in the Civil Rights Cases because there was no state action.215 This
intimation comports with Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases that state inaction is state action.216 Not surprisingly, the
206. See id. at 14–17. Justice Harlan dissented in the Civil Rights Cases, reasoning that state
action includes a state’s failure to prevent private discrimination on the basis of race. Id. at 46–47
(Harlan, J., dissenting). This issue surfaced in more recent cases that were not about race, but the
Court held that state inaction is not state action. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748, 751, 768 (2005) (determining there is no property interest in having a restraining order
enforced and police failure to respond to a mother’s plea for help from an abusive father is not
state action); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989)
(finding no state action when the father beat his son Joshua even though state social workers were
aware he was being abused).
207. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19. Interestingly, the CRC Court also noted that
individuals who are harmed by private people typically have state remedies, implying there is no
need to impose another remedial scheme based on federal law. See id. at 17. This Article goes
further and suggests states should provide money damages when individuals are harmed by state
action.
208. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
209. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
210. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17
(2012)).
211. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 242–44, 246.
212. Id. at 249.
213. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883).
214. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 (“This is not to say that the [the Fourteenth
Amendment] authority upon which [Congress] acted was not adequate, a question upon which we
do not pass, but merely that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have
considered it alone.”).
215. Id. at 249–50.
216. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46–47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the 1966 case,
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contemporary Court has reaffirmed that state inaction is not state
action.217 However, and as analyzed below in Subsection III.B.3, valid
enforcement legislation that imposes obligations on states as deterrent
measures to prevent actual constitutional violations in essence make
states “act,” and their failure to act makes them vulnerable to money
damages if the legislation clearly intends to abrogate their immunity.218
Although the Heart of Atlanta Court left open the § 5 issue, the
holding highlights that Congress has the Commerce Clause power to
prohibit discrimination by private persons engaged in commerce and this
enables the Circling Back Phenomenon. Moreover, rights created by
Congress using its Article I powers are statutory rights. The difference
between a statutory right and a constitutional right might not seem
significant to someone who experiences race discrimination. For
example, Ollie’s Barbeque had to serve African Americans because of
the CRA—not because of the Fourteenth Amendment—and the
difference did not matter in everyday life.219 But statutory rights are
vulnerable to changing or disappearing altogether depending on the
political majority. Constitutional rights can also change and disappear,
but they are more insulated by the arduous amendment process,220 Article

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited private
discrimination in commerce, id. at 753–56, but the Justices were divided over the question of
whether Congress could prohibit such conduct under its § 5 power, compare id. at 753–56
(emphasizing that Congress did “not purport to give substantive . . . implementation to any rights
secured by [the Equal Protection] Clause.”), with id. at 783 (equating the enforcement power
conferred to Congress in § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment with that power conferred in § 5 of the
same). The Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), held it could not. Id. at 626–
27. The Court’s intimation in the Civil Rights Cases could also mean it saw merit in Justice
Douglas’s concurrence in Heart of Atlanta, in which he said that state action exists because state
judges enforce state (trespass) laws—relying on the controversial Shelley v. Kraemer decision.
See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 282–83 (Douglas, J., concurring). For an excellent article that
argues Shelley should have been decided under the Thirteenth Amendment case law, see generally
Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 451 (2007). But see Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES
169, 200 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, eds., 2004) (arguing Shelley was correctly
decided under property law). Some studies show that the decision had a measurable impact on
racial segregation patterns in the 1950s. See, e.g., Yana Kucheva & Richard Sander, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Shelley v. Kraemer, 48 SOC. SCI. RES. 212, 212 (2014)
(“[L]imiting the enforceability of restrictive covenants enabled a new kind of black intra-city
migration.”). However, the § 5 cases have not implicated Shelley-type issues.
217. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (reaffirming that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
state action, not private conduct).
218. See infra Section III.B.3.
219. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 304–05 (1964).
220. See U.S. C ONST . art. V. I thank Michael Brennan for this insight.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1

1130

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

III’s life tenure and salary protections for federal judges,221 and the
judiciary’s respect for stare decisis.222
Importantly, the availability of remedies for violations is not the same
for statutory and constitutional rights. Circling back, Seminole Tribe held
that Congress cannot abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under Article
I, but it can hold states to standards using its Article I powers.223 Congress
also has Article I power to create private rights of action for damages
against private people.224 Contrastingly, § 1983, although valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity
because Congress did not make its intent to do so clear.225 In addition to
a clear intent to abrogate, legislation under § 5 also must meet the Boerne
Test,226 another significant limitation on Congress’s enforcement power.
B. The “Congruence and Proportionality” Test as a Fourteenth
Amendment Limitation
To understand the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under the
Test, it is helpful to briefly review the basic Fourteenth Amendment
analytical framework because it defines the relationship between the state
and the individual. When Congress, through its enforcement power,
interjects itself into that relationship, things change. Moreover, the
direction these changes take is determined by the Court in its Marbury
role to “emphatically . . . say what the law is.”227
1. Background: The Basic Fourteenth Amendment
Analytical Framework
In footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,228 the Court
introduced the concept of heightened judicial review for laws that burden
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
222. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“When the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court
will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis,
and contrary expectations must be disappointed.”).
223. See supra notes 151–58 and accompanying text.
224. Alleged violations of federal statutory rights also can be brought under § 1983. Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). However, the contemporary Court, consistent with the Shield,
is also establishing higher hurdles for those types of cases. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (“[I]f Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it
must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than what is required for
Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of action.”).
225. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
226. See infra Section III.B.2.
227. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
228. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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fundamental rights and also for laws that discriminate against “discrete
and insular minorities,” like racial minorities.229 Prior to heightened
review, the Court subjected laws to rational basis review, regardless of
what was at stake for an individual.230 This flat standard of review
nullified the reality that fundamental rights are more important than other
rights, and that some types of discrimination are more unacceptable than
other types. Given this reality, holding the government to higher
standards to justify laws that regulate fundamental rights or that
discriminate against particular groups not only is logical, but it is an
analytical framework that is necessary to give meaning to the
constitutional design with respect to individual liberties.231
Since Footnote 4, of course, the Court has embellished its equal
protection and due process hierarchies. Infringements on fundamental
rights are subject to strict scrutiny,232 except that a woman’s right to
choose, although part of an individual’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
“liberty,” is subject to the “undue burden standard.”233 On the equal
protection side, the most unacceptable forms of discrimination—like race
229. Id. at 152 n.4 (“It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition . . . and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”).
230. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
231. I explore the importance of maintaining the basic Fourteenth Amendment analytical
framework in another article. Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper
Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
685 (2008). Renowned scholars criticize the analytical framework, among other reasons, for the
Court’s imposition in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), of the disparate impact rule and
the need to prove an illegal motive in order for heightened review to apply to facially neutral laws.
See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (criticizing the doctrine of discriminatory
purpose established by Washington v. Davis). Consistent with addressing this criticism, Professor
Vicki C. Jackson persuasively argues for “proportionality” review in one of her articles. See Vicki
C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3178 (2015)
(“A standard focused not only on the nature of the classification but also on the relative nature of
the harm complained of and its relationship to the particular government interests at stake would
allow courts the flexibility to hold legislatures accountable without invalidating most
legislation.”).
232. Strict scrutiny review requires the state to justify the underlying law by demonstrating
that it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326, 334, 343 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan has a compelling state interest
in admitting a diverse law school class and that race can be one factor in a holistic review of each
applicant).
233. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870, 876, 877 (1992)
(determining that a woman has a right to an abortion prior to viability, but the state can regulate
her choice so long as it does not impose an undue burden on her or place substantial obstacles in
her path).
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discrimination—also are subject to strict scrutiny,234 except
discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to intermediate scrutiny.235 If
a law under due process or equal protection is not subject to heightened
review, it merely has to be rational.236
This basic analytical framework defines critical Fourteenth
Amendment relationships. Whenever individuals challenge the
constitutionality of a state law,237 they are challenging their fellowcitizens’ majority vote to impose whatever the state law’s requirement is.
When the analytical framework requires only that the majority act
rationally, it is logical for it to be harder for an individual to win a
challenge. Couched in terms of the distinction in the Tenth Amendment
between the state and the people, in the realm of rational basis review,
the people have delegated to the state the power to act as their collective
“rational” selves. In fact, laws are presumed rational and the individual
challenging a law under this level of review has the burden to show the
law serves no legitimate state end.238
Flip the analysis and view it from the individual’s perspective. Again,
couched in terms of the distinction between the state and the people, when
an individual is separating from the majority’s effort to have the state law
234. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated on other
grounds by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). In evaluating the constitutionality of the
removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry during WWII to relocation camps, the Court held,
“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” Id.
235. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law will be upheld if it is substantially related to an
important government interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1966), the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute’s policy of
admitting only male students was unconstitutional because VMI could not demonstrate an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the policy. Id. at 534. This language did not
substantively change the standard of review and the Court in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), recently cited to both Virginia and Craig as the standard
of review in sex discrimination cases. See id. at 728–29; see also infra notes 273–86 and
accompanying text (analyzing Hibbs).
236. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
237. A different analysis applies when an individual alleges that an individual state actor or
a local government has violated his or her rights, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
238. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). This is an
incredibly high burden to meet because the Court has held that any conceivable rational purpose
will sustain the law. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (stating that
the proffered justification for the law does not need to be the actual reason for it; it only has to be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest). Occasionally, a law will fail rational basis
review. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 635 (1996) (determining that the second
amendment to Colorado’s constitution, which repealed local laws that prohibited sexual
orientation discrimination, served no legitimate purpose and was motivated by animus); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (holding that requiring a use permit for a home for mentally disabled
people served no legitimate purpose and was motivated by irrational prejudice).
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represent the people, there must be a different analytical framework to
support the importance of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection guarantees that are subject to heightened review. The
“majority wins” aspect of a democracy yields in the heightened review
spaces to the democratic principle that individual rights need to be
protected from majoritarian oppression. In such cases, the people of the
state cannot delegate to their state the power to deny the individual the
framework of analysis—heightened review—that comports with the
important distinction between ordinary and fundamental rights, on the
one hand, and acceptable versus unacceptable discrimination on the other
hand, as decided by the Court. In fact, the people of the United States
delegated this heightened protection of due process and equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government—both to the
Supreme Court, through its interpretative powers, and to Congress,
through its enforcement power.239
2. City of Boerne v. Flores
At issue in Boerne was the question of whether Congress exceeded its
§ 5 power when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA),240 requiring states to meet the strict scrutiny standard of review
for laws that burden the free exercise of religion but otherwise are neutral
and generally applicable.241 Significantly, the Court had held in a
previous case, Employment Division v. Smith,242 that such laws merely
have to meet rational basis review.243 The Boerne Court held that
imposing the higher standard of review on states exceeded Congress’s
power because RFRA created a new right and therefore was not an
enforcement of an existing right.244 More emphatically, RFRA essentially
overruled Smith, which was its intent as stated in the law,245 and
obviously Congress does not have the power to overrule the Court
239. The contemporary Court in Boerne does not view Congress as a coequal partner under
§ 5 because it essentially gives Congress no power to share in the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 452–54 (2000).
More recently, Professor Pamela S. Karlan describes the Court’s view of Congress as disdainful.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2012).
240. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)),
invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
241. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515–16, 529.
242. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79, 881 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs,
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
243. Id. at 885.
244. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 536.
245. Id. at 515.
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through ordinary legislation.246 From this perspective, Boerne is
deceptively easy.
Boerne also teaches that the standard of review that attaches to the
constitutional right under the basic analytical framework is part of the
right. In the context of state laws that burden religious free exercise but
that are neutral on their face and generally applicable, this right in Smith
was subject to rational basis review, but this right in RFRA was subject
to strict scrutiny. By raising the standard of review, RFRA created a new
right, changing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment separate from
any concerns about overruling the Court, and that exceeded its
enforcement power.
In reaching this conclusion, the Boerne Court held that Congress’s
power is remedial,247 which is the same standard applied in the Civil
Rights Cases,248 but which is narrower than the plenary standard applied
in Fitzpatrick.249 Naturally, given the contemporary Court’s protection of
246. See id. at 529. Professor Balkin questions why Congress’s interpretation of RFRA,
particularly because RFRA as applied to the federal government is constitutional as decided in
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), is not
supported by the Necessary and Proper Clause and McCulloch. Balkin, supra note 9, at 1814 &
n.51. This is an interesting question when viewed from the perspective of Congress’s role, if any,
in constitutional interpretation. From a federalism perspective, though, the decision in Gonzales
is consistent with the principle that the political majority (U.S. citizens) can enact laws that give
individuals more constitutional protection than is required. That is what RFRA accomplished; it
subjected RFRA to the compelling interest standard and the federal government failed to meet its
burden to stop the importation of an illegal drug that was used for religious purposes. See
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423. As applied to the states, however, the Boerne Court held that Congress
(U.S. citizens) cannot impose a higher constitutional burden on states than is constitutionally
required. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. If the citizens of a state want to enact a similar act that gives
greater protection to its citizens, that generally would be constitutional, but, of course, it also
would be subject to other constitutional limitations. See generally Berta Esperanza HernándezTruyol, Religion: Rites vs. Rights Resolving Tensions Between LGBT Equality and Religious
Liberty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LGBTI LAW – SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER EXPRESSIONS AND SEX CHARACTERISTICS (SOGIESC) LAW FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL-COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Andreas Ziegler ed.) (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3131155 [https://perma.cc/G2KY-Y5SB].
247. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
248. See id. at 524–25. But see Post & Siegel, supra note 239, at 475–76 (exploring how
reliance on the Civil Rights Cases is misguided because it is “largely irrelevant” to the scope of
Congress’s § 5 power).
249. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). It is not clear why the Fitzpatrick
Court changed the standard, but two significant voting rights cases, South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), were decided just ten
years earlier. Those cases (the VRA cases) evaluated the constitutionality of various provisions,
including the preclearance requirement, of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which was
enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under § 2 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by
“appropriate legislation.” Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643, 651 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2);
accord South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 307–08. Although the VRA was enacted pursuant to the
Fifteenth Amendment, notably, § 10(b) authorizes the Attorney General to enforce the Act “[i]n
the exercise of the powers of Congress under section 5 of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and
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state sovereignty, the return to the remedial standard is not surprising.250
Nor is it surprising that the dissenting Justices argue for the plenary
standard. But this presupposes that only one of those standards applies,
much like the Court pre-Footnote 4 functioned on the same rational basis
review standard regardless of what was at issue.
This Article suggests that the Test would comport more accurately
with the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, would not violate
separation of powers principles, and would function more clearly if the
scope of Congress’s power varied depending on the importance of the
right Congress sought to address; this would reflect the varying standard
of review the Court applies based on the importance of the underlying
right. Toward this goal, it is time to unravel the Test. Recall that
Congress’s enforcement power extends to enacting legislation that is
congruent and proportional to “the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.”251
3. Unraveling Congruence and Proportionality
a. The Boerne Inconsistency
The Boerne Court held that Congress’s enforcement power is
remedial, but its description of what “remedial” means is confusing as the
following passage shows: “Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”252
The idea that Congress can use its enforcement power not just to
“remedy” violations, but also to “deter” them, seems inconsistent with
the basic holding of Boerne: that Congress does not have power to create
section 2 of the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment.” Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§ 10(b), 79 Stat. 437, 442 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(b) (2012)). Boerne’s return
to the remedial standard, given the Fitzpatrick Court’s reasoning for holding that it is plenary, is
quite significant in light of Shelby County v. Holder, discussed infra at Section III.B.4.a.
250. To support its conclusion, the Boerne Court stressed that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment originally used the “necessary and proper” language, but changed it to the
“appropriate” language after extensive debate. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 522 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). The original language partially read: “The Congress
shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure . . . .” CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). The Morgan Court also explicitly refers to the language
change in the Amendment and held that “[t]he substitution of the ‘appropriate legislation’ formula
was never thought to have the effect of diminishing the scope of this congressional power.”
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 n.9. Professor Balkin argues that the McCulloch standard is the correct
one to apply in evaluating § 5 legislation. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 1810–15.
251. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
252. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455).
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rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.253 Specifically, a law that
provides a remedy helps make an injured person whole. Clearly,
Congress’s enforcement power is remedial in the sense that it extends to
remedying actual constitutional violations.254 A law that provides a
deterrent, however, helps prevent an actual constitutional violation from
happening. Deterrent measures impose obligations on states to act to
prevent constitutional violations. Individuals benefit from such measures,
almost as if they enjoy the right to be protected from suffering a potential
actual constitutional violation. This is what I call the Boerne
inconsistency and it spawns tremendous confusion about how the Test is
supposed to function. The late Justice Scalia opined that Congress’s
power is no broader than remedying actual constitutional violations,255
which would obviate the confusion, but the Court has not adopted that
position. Much of the confusion, in my opinion, stems from the Court’s
application of the flat “remedial” standard to define the scope of
Congress’s enforcement power, regardless of whether the constitutional
value that needs protection is federalism or individual rights.
b. An Imaginary Federal Target with Three Zones
As a visual guide to the following analysis, represented by the diagram
in the Appendix, imagine a federal target with three rings that represent
the federal statute. The bull’s-eye, Zone 1, represents the space of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and unlawful state action in Zone 1 is an
actual constitutional violation. For clarity, Zone 1 is divided into Zones
1A and 1B, representing the reality that some rights are subject to rational
basis review (Zone 1A) and some are subject to heightened review (Zone
1B). The next ring, Zone 2, represents the statutory deterrent measures,
or “shadow rights,”256 given in the enforcement statute. Unlawful state
action in this space results in “shadow violations.”257 By shadow rights
253. See id. at 519.
254. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
255. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 45 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558–60 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting));
infra Section III.B.4.b (analyzing Coleman). This also was the position of Justice Harlan in
Morgan. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
256. I use “rights” in the lay sense for clarity’s sake, because in legal context, the Court
distinguishes between “rights” and statutory “interests” or “benefits” in the implied right of action
context, which is beyond the scope of this Article. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283
(2002) (“Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. Accordingly, it is rights,
not . . . ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under . . . that section.”). For Congress to
create a statutory right, “its text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited.’” Id. at 284
(quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)). Moreover, the statute must
also create a private remedy. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
257. This Article refers to the enforcement provisions in Zone 2 as “shadow rights” and
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and violations, I mean actual violations of the enforcement statute that
are closely related to actual constitutional violations because the deterrent
measures are targeted at preventing actual constitutional violations in
Zone 1. The Court’s emphasis on the remedial nature of Congress’s
enforcement power under the Test258 confirms that Zone 1 does not—and
constitutionally cannot—cast a long shadow. In other words, the Zone 2
band on the target is not wide and, as will become evident, is even
shrinking. Finally, the outer ring, Zone 3, represents other “rights”259
given by the federal statute. Zone 3 “rights” and violations are subject to
the law governing Congress’s Article I powers and limitations.260
c. How does the Test Work?
i. Zone 1: Actual Constitutional Violations
The late Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court in United States
v. Georgia261 in 2006, opined that “no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress
the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of
those provisions.”262 Enforcement legislation that remedies actual
constitutional violations in Zone 1 is valid as long as the law includes a
clear statement that Congress intends to abrogate a state’s immunity.
Moreover, it does not matter for purposes of the Test whether the violated
right is in Zone 1A or 1B because the standard of review is part of the
underlying right. Admittedly, an actual violation in Zone 1A will be less
likely to happen because that space only requires rational basis review
and it is rarer for an individual to suffer irrational discrimination than it
is for an individual to suffer discrimination that is subject to heightened
review in Zone 1B. But the likelihood of suffering an injury in Zone 1 is
irrelevant in evaluating whether the enforcement statute meets the Test,
“shadow violations” because Congress cannot create rights using its enforcement power and,
equally important, they are not rights in a technical legal sense, but in everyday life, they function
like rights, especially to non-lawyers and potential victims. For example, suppose that Congress
provides by statute that employers, including state employers, have to reasonably accommodate
persons with disabilities. Clearly, disability discrimination is a right that is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of the right would fall into Zone 1. One might call the
“reasonable accommodations” provision a statutory “right,” and, in everyday conversation, it
makes sense to talk about the “right to be reasonably accommodated.” Again, Congress cannot
create rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the “reasonable accommodations”
provision is a deterrent measure or remedy that must meet the Test—that is, prevent and remedy
violations of the constitutional right—to be valid enforcement legislation.
258. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 525.
259. Again, the underlying federal statute might create rights, but it might create “interests”
or “benefits.” See supra note 256.
260. See infra Section III.B.3.c.iii.
261. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
262. Id. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
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because the law is premised on the individual having already suffered the
injury. Significantly, it is apt to define Congress’s enforcement power
“remedial” in this space, because that is exactly what the statute does; it
remedies actual constitutional violations.
Thus, application of the Test does not present confusing issues with
respect to Zone 1. However, two puzzling issues lurk in this Zone. First,
Congress could amend § 1983 to provide that it clearly intends to
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity. This would maximize its
enforcement power in all of Zone 1. It also is the best way to avoid the
Void and provide money damages against states for individuals who are
actually harmed when their Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated.
Moreover, the line of cases explored under the Test below all include a
clear expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate states’ immunity,
evidencing Congress’s support for making this avenue of redress
available.263 Indeed, it is ironic that statutes like the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),264 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),265 and the Family Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA),266 for example, include clear statements, but whether
they successfully abrogate states’ immunity turns on meeting the Test.267
Section 1983—the historic valid Fourteenth Amendment statute—fails to
abrogate because it lacks the clear intent statement.268 Finally, even if
§ 1983 were amended to include such a statement, the Circling Back
Phenomenon would still be in play and Congress would have Article I
power, the Young doctrine, and enforcement by the United States to
regulate states and hold them to standards.
The second puzzlement in Zone 1 relates to the question of whether a
particular enforcement statute that fails the Test, as explored below in
Zone 2, nevertheless remains valid with respect to abrogating a state’s
immunity for actual violations in Zone 1. The reason for the confusion
263. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27 (2003) (evaluating the
family-leave provision of the FMLA); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364
(2001) (evaluating provisions of the ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73–74
(2000) (evaluating provisions of the ADEA). In Kimel, Justices Thomas and Kennedy dissented
on whether Congress had intended to abrogate state immunity. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 100–01
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
47 U.S.C.).
265. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)).
266. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29
U.S.C.).
267. See cases cited supra note 263.
268. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“The language of § 1983
falls far short of satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to
alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must
make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” (quoting
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))).
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seems to be that the plaintiffs in the cases that failed abrogation, unlike
the plaintiff in Georgia, did not suffer actual constitutional violations, so
Zone 1 is never implicated in those cases.269 An amendment to § 1983 to
include the clear statement rule, naturally, would obviate this confusion
because it would provide a right of action for any individual who suffers
an actual constitutional violation while leaving the Test intact to be
applied to Zone 2 violations.
ii. Zone 2: The Enforcement Statute’s Remedial and Deterrent
Measures
This Zone harbors most of the confusion because this is where the
heart of the Test applies, although Zone 1 also plays a significant role
because the validity of the enforcement statute is closely connected to the
underlying constitutional right.
Understanding the Relationships at Stake: Boerne’s progeny show
that the shadow rights created by the enforcement statute in this Zone are
more likely to meet the Test the more closely they are targeted at deterring
actual constitutional violations in Zone 1. Again, Zone 1 does not cast a
long shadow. However, it does cast two shadows and the shadow cast by
Zone 1A is, and should be, shorter than the one cast by Zone 1B.
Specifically, in Zone 1A—the rational basis space—the Tenth
Amendment predominantly defines the critical relationships among the
state, the individual, and Congress: states have more leeway in the
rational basis review space in regulating individual rights,270 and
therefore Congress should have less leeway in that space regulating
states. In fact, the Court has held that states are not violating the
269. Cf. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157, 159–60 (evaluating a paraplegic
inmate’s claim alleging that while in state prison he suffered actual violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights (incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment) and also violations of Title
II of the ADA, and remanding the case for clarification of his pro se complaint in evaluating his
ADA claims). But see infra notes 398–403 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
270. This is not to say, of course, that an individual’s rights cannot be violated even in the
rational basis realm, because the Court has held some laws unconstitutional under rational basis
review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(requiring permit for group home for mentally disabled served no legitimate purpose and was
motivated by “irrational prejudice”); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496, 506
(1977) (plurality opinion) (finding ordinance defining family in way that prohibited a
grandmother from living with grandsons who were cousins and not siblings unconstitutional). For
an excellent analysis of Moore, see generally Nancy E. Dowd, John Moore Jr.: Moore v. City of
East Cleveland and Children’s Constitutional Arguments, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2603 (2017),
which tells the story of Moore from the child’s perspective and constructs constitutional claims
on the child’s behalf. Nor is this to say that Congress lacks the enforcement power for actual
constitutional violations. See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158. However, enforcement legislation targeted
at actual violations that harm individuals is different from more generalized enforcement
legislation when a state does not have a history and pattern of irrational discrimination.
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Constitution unless they are acting irrationally271—or as I describe it,
have “gone wild.” As explored below, legislation that connects Zones 1A
and 2 have all failed abrogation, which illustrates how unlikely it is that
states will have gone wild.272 Therefore, there should be less need for
Congress to use its enforcement power, and the Court should be less
deferential, consistent with striking the appropriate federalism balance.
Conversely, in Zone 1B—the heightened review space—the Fourteenth
Amendment predominantly defines the relevant relationships: states have
less leeway in the heightened review space in regulating individual rights,
and Congress should have more leeway in that space regulating states.
A brief overview of a few important § 5 cases illustrates that this
description accurately reflects how the Court applies the Test.
The Zone 1B and Zone 2 Relationships: The Court upheld
enforcement legislation in two cases that involved Zone 1B rights.273 To
highlight, using the Court’s comparative terminology highlighted in
italics, it seems that the general rule for meeting the Test is this: if the
constitutional right is subject to heightened review, then the Court will be
more deferential and it will be easier for Congress to meet the Test. This
is consistent with the Court’s holdings in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs274 and Tennessee v. Lane.275
In Hibbs, the Court upheld Congress’s power in the FMLA to require
employers (including state employers) to give employees unpaid time off
to provide for family and medical care.276 The constitutional right at stake
was Mr. Hibbs’s right to be free from sex discrimination, which is subject
to intermediate scrutiny, placing it in Zone 1B.277 There is no
271. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
272. See supra notes 304–19 and accompanying text. An exception might be in the area of
LGBTQ rights. See ARAIZA, supra note 9, at 162.
273. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513, 533–34 (2004) (involving disability
discrimination in the administration of judicial services); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 730, 740 (2003) (involving sex discrimination). In Georgia, the Court reviewed a state
prisoner’s pro se lawsuit against the state alleging violations of his rights under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits disability discrimination in public services.
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 153. He also alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 157. The
Court remanded his case with instructions on how to clarify his complaint so that it was clearer
what his allegations were under different laws so that the Court could better evaluate whether the
Test was satisfied. Id. at 159. In its opinion, Justice Scalia opined that Congress has the power to
abrogate for actual constitutional violations. Id. at 158. In contrast, the Court held in Morrison
that the VAWA, involving sex discrimination, was invalid because there was no state action and
violence is not an economic activity. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 605,
613, 627 (2000).
274. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
275. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
276. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724–26. The Court held that the self-care provision of the FMLA did
not validly abrogate in Coleman. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 35 (2012);
see infra Section III.B.4.b (analyzing Coleman).
277. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
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constitutional right to take unpaid leave for family and medical care. That
shadow right (preventive measure) came from the FMLA, placing it in
Zone 2. The question presented in Hibbs was whether Congress’s use of
its enforcement power to connect Zone 1B with Zone 2 was constitutional
under both the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, making abrogation
valid.278
Congress presented evidence of a history and pattern of sex
discrimination in the workplace by state employers and opined that
“[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.”279
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the FMLA family
and medical care provisions met the Test and successfully abrogated
states’ sovereign immunity.280 On the federal target, the Zone 2 shadow
rights were “congruent and proportional” to preventing and remedying
sex discrimination—Zone 1B violations.281
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by Justices
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.282 Notably, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joined with the other three Justices to
uphold abrogation of the family care provision of the FMLA because of
the widespread and historically persistent sex inequality in the United
States.283 The Chief Justice even referred to the widespread
discrimination against women based on stereotypes about their
unsuitability for work outside the home.284 Critically important, their
votes in support of valid abrogation acknowledged that failure to provide
the statutory leave would not necessarily result in a constitutional
violation in Zone 1B. In other words, the majority vote rested on an
acknowledgement that Zone 2 legislation can be valid even if the Zone 2
preventive measure can be violated without also having a concomitant
Zone 1B violation. This is an affirmation of the Boerne inconsistency.285
In this way, finding a history and pattern serves as evidence of the
“likelihood” of an actual constitutional violation occurring and the
“likelihood” that the preventive measure will deter it from happening.
Imposing on state employers a measure such as the family care provision
in the FMLA undeniably is likely to prevent some sex discrimination.
Further, the increasing knowledge and understanding about how implicit
278. See id. at 726. Regardless, FMLA is constitutional under Article I, placing it in Zone 3,
and the Circling Back Phenomenon would apply. See infra Section III.B.3.c.iii.
279. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
280. Id. at 725.
281. Id. at 737 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)).
282. Id. at 723.
283. See id. at 729–30.
284. Id. at 729.
285. See supra Section III.B.3.a.
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bias functions supports this observation.286 In other words, while the
history of sex discrimination started because of explicit bias against
women, we now know that discrimination can be the result of
unintentional or implicit bias. Nevertheless, questions remain: How is
“likely” to be measured? And, more importantly, who should decide
whether “likely” is met? In answering these questions, the difference
between a Zone 1A and Zone 2 connection versus a Zone 1B and Zone 2
connection is highly relevant. Given Congress’s explicit role in enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment,287 once the Court has determined the
meaning of the Amendment (consistent with its role in a Marbury sense),
then Congress’s judgment in evaluating “likelihoods” in Zone 1B and
Zone 2 relationships should control (consistent with McCulloch). This
would be a harmonious separation of powers balance.
Similarly, but with a twist, the Lane Court upheld Congress’s power
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to abrogate
states’ sovereign immunity to prevent disability discrimination in “cases
implicating the accessibility of judicial services.”288 Mr. Lane faced
criminal charges that required him to appear for hearings in a courthouse
that lacked elevator access.289 Significantly, his complaint also included
a claim that the state violated his Due Process rights under the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment (Zone 1B).290
Although disability discrimination falls into Zone 1A because it is
subject to rational basis review,291 the ADA also “seeks to enforce a
variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which
are subject to more searching judicial review.”292 For example, the ADA
286. For an excellent analysis of how implicit bias negatively affects working environments,
see Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2017), and see
also Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66
EMORY L.J. 765, 771 (2017), which discusses the negative effect of implicit bias in the school
safety context.
287. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
288. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513, 531 (2004). Although disability discrimination
is subject to rational basis review, it is still a Zone 1A violation if the unlawful state action is
irrational. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
289. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513–14. Mr. Lane crawled up the stairs to make his first appearance,
but he refused to do that in his second appearance and he also refused to be carried up the stairs
to the hearing room. Id. at 514. The other plaintiff, Beverly Jones, was a court reporter who also
is a paraplegic and alleged she lost work because she could not “gain access to a number of county
courthouses.” Id. at 513–14.
290. See id. at 523.
291. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (“Our refusal to recognize the [mentally disabled] as a
quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination. To
withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally [disabled]
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
292. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23.
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requires states “to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and
other barriers to accessibility.”293 This requirement creates a Zone 2
“shadow right” (preventive measure). Because the Court was evaluating
a Zone 1B and Zone 2 relationship, it was easier for Congress to meet the
Test and the Court was more deferential to Congress’s judgment. The
Court noted that “the record of constitutional violations . . . including
judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and statistical,
legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services—far
exceeds the record in Hibbs.”294 The Lane Court upheld the provision of
the ADA.295
Notably, in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist parted ways with the Hibbs
majority (including Justice O’Connor) on the point about how close the
relationship between Zone 1 and Zone 2 needs to be for enforcement
legislation to be valid.296 Specifically, the Chief Justice dissented in Lane
because he was persuaded that Congress provided no evidence of a
history and pattern of actual constitutional violations or even arguable
constitutional violations by the states based on disability.297 Without that,
he opined that there can be no Zone 2 validity.298 Stated alternatively, the
preventive measures in Zone 2 cannot be considered “without regard for
whether the failure to accommodate [under the ADA] results in a
constitutional wrong.”299 In his opinion, moreover, Mr. Lane did not even
suffer an actual constitutional violation.300
Critically, there is a strong parallel between the histories of sex and
disability discrimination. Just as women and men throughout history have
been held back because of sex stereotyping, so too have people with

293. Id. at 531. But states are not “required to undertake measures that would impose an
undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the service.” Id. at 532. These limitations relate to the scope
of Congress’s enforcement power, but they also are relevant to the ADA’s validity under Article
I if and when the Circling Back Phenomenon takes place. Specifically, the anti-commandeering
principle presumably would invalidate a congressional mandate that made states engage in certain
activities or incur certain expenses. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor also note this distinction in
their concurring opinion in Garrett. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376
(2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.
295. Id. at 533–34.
296. Id. at 538–39 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 541.
298. See id. at 541–42.
299. Id. at 533 (majority opinion). Given that he treated Lane as a Zone 1A (not Zone 1B)
and Zone 2 relationship, his opinion fits into the basic analysis for those relationships. See id. at
540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause permits classifications
on basis of disability only when there is “a rational basis for doing so”).
300. Id. at 543.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1

1144

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

disabilities. Just as the Court itself sanctioned sex discrimination,301 so
has it done the same with respect to disability discrimination.302
Arguably, the misstep in the comparison of these two types of
discrimination comes from the Court’s decision to apply rational basis
review and not heightened review to disability discrimination under the
basic analytical framework,303 which is directly related to Congress’s
power under § 5. One can only speculate whether the Chief Justice would
have voted to sustain the validity of the ADA in Lane, just as he did in
Hibbs, if disability discrimination were subject to heightened review.
Regardless, it is difficult to reconcile the cases’ outcomes in light of the
widespread stereotyping and histories of discrimination faced by people
in both equal protection classes. Again, this evidences how delicate the
voting balance is in the § 5 cases.
Zone 1A and Zone 2 Relationships: In contrast to the Hibbs and Lane
decisions, cases that involve Zone 1A and Zone 2 relationships fail to
meet the Test. One might say relationships here are theoretical place
holders. This is not surprising because Congress would have to produce
evidence that there is a history and pattern of irrational discrimination by
the states—that they have gone wild—for Congress to successfully
abrogate in the rational review basis space.304 Congress has not been able
to show that and therefore violations of Zone 2 preventive measures in
underlying enforcement statutes have not successfully abrogated states’
sovereign immunity.305
For example, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,306 the Court faced the question whether Title I of the ADA is a
valid exercise of Congress’s abrogation power.307 Title I protects
employees from disability discrimination in the workplace and requires
301. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137, 139 (1873) (discussing how
women do not enjoy the “privilege” of practicing law).
302. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding state compulsory
sterilization law for mentally disabled people).
303. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
304. See id. at 446. A strong case can be made that discrimination against members of the
LGBTQ community is irrational and widespread and therefore should fall within Congress’s
enforcement power—even as a Zone 1A case. This would be clearer if such discrimination were
subject to heightened review and fell into Zone 1B, but the Supreme Court cases on sexual
orientation have failed rational basis review, obviating the need to decide with certainty where
sexual orientation falls on the equal protection paradigm. See generally ARAIZA, supra note 9, at
76–80 (discussing sexual orientation cases at the Court); Rush, supra note 231 (noting that there
is a proper methodology that courts apply when reviewing cases at the intersection of due process
and equal protection, which extends to the context of sexual orientation and gay marriage).
305. What this means for the individual who suffers an actual constitutional violation is
unclear. See supra Section III.B.3.c.
306. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
307. Id. at 363–64.
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employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled workers.308
Ms. Garrett, an employee of the University of Alabama, had to take time
off from work to seek medical care and recover from breast cancer.309
When she returned to work, however, her job was no longer available and
she had to take a lower paying one.310 She sued Alabama for money
damages under the ADA (Zone 2).311 To meet the Test, Congress would
have needed evidence that states have gone wild with respect to
workplace disability discrimination and, understandably, Congress could
not do that.312 Moreover, Ms. Garrett did not even suffer an actual
violation in Zone 1A, meaning Alabama’s employment decisions were
rational and therefore not unconstitutional.313 Therefore, Congress lacked
enforcement power to abrogate Alabama’s sovereign immunity under
Title I of the ADA.314
Similarly, the Court held that Congress could not show a pattern of
irrational age discrimination with respect to Congress’s enforcement
power under the ADEA in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.315 Like
Ms. Garrett, the Kimel plaintiff also did not suffer an actual constitutional
violation.316 Zone 1A cases—the “rational basis” cases—protect state
sovereignty because that space is where the people’s collective rationality
is presumptively constitutional and Congress did not produce evidence
that the states had gone wild.317 Again, requiring states to meet Zone 2
requirements or face potential money damages is to impose a burden on
states that is not constitutionally required, and this violates federalism
because the burden effects a substantive change in what is required of
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.318 However, and to emphasize,
308. Id. at 360–61.
309. Id. at 362. Milton Ash also was a plaintiff who suffered from asthma and alleged his
employer would not accommodate his needs. Id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 368.
313. See id. at 367.
314. Id. at 360. Under the basic Fourteenth Amendment analytical framework, the plaintiff
has the burden of proof to show the employer’s decision was not rational, but the ADA
unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the state. Id. at 372.
315. 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000).
316. See id. at 91 (“Congress’ failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination here confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic
legislation was necessary in this field. . . . [W]e hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of
Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
317. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.
318. Naturally, states can provide individuals with more protection than is constitutionally
required and that also is consistent with federalism and the principle that states are “labs of
experimentation.” See supra note 128 and accompanying text. However, the analysis is far more
complicated when individual rights compete as they do, for example, in the area of sexual
orientation discrimination and religious freedom. See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 246; see also
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720, 1724 (2018)
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irrational discrimination against an individual by a state actor is a Zone
1A violation and enforcement legislation that abrogates a state’s
immunity would be valid.319 These are very different outcomes and
reflect a balancing of the critical Fourteenth Amendment relationships
with Tenth Amendment principles.
In reality, the scope of Congress’s power varies: The Boerne Court
held that Congress’s power is remedial,320 meaning the scope of
Congress’s power is the same regardless of whether Zone 1A or 1B is the
target of the legislation. But it is not the same; Congress’s power is
broader when Zones 1B and 2 are connected. It is broader because the
Boerne Court held that it includes the power to enact preventive or
deterrent measures to decrease the likelihood that a Zone 1 violation will
occur.321 Saying Congress’s power is broader (substantively different) in
Zone 1B is qualitatively different from saying it is easier to meet the Test
or saying that the Court will give greater deference to Congress in Zone
1B and Zone 2 relationships. To describe Congress’s power as “plenary”
in the Zones 1B and 2 relationships not only is more accurate, but it also
provides a more concrete guideline than “easier than” or “harder than,”
because the standard “plenary” is well-established.
Admittedly, if Zone 2 successfully abrogates, then Zone 2 violations
are remedial. More accurately, then, Zone 2 can be both remedial and
preventive, but “remedial” in Zone 2 pertains to statutory “shadow rights
and violations,” and not constitutional rights and violations. Moreover,
the Court acknowledges that it will give greater deference to Congress
legislating the Zones 1B and 2 relationships, consistent with an
understanding that Congress’s power is broader.322
To acknowledge that Congress’s “remedial” power is broader or
narrower depending on the underlying relationships in the enforcement
statute can be consistent with the contemporary Court’s jurisprudence at
the Intersection. In other words, such an acknowledgement does mean a
return to the Tenth Amendment in the dismissive sense for at least three
reasons. First, the Tenth Amendment is not violated when Congress
abrogates for actual violations in Zone 1. Second, it is the predominant
constitutional provision defining the Zone 1A and Zone 2 relationships.
Finally, and perhaps the best evidence, is the Court’s record on protecting
state sovereignty. Recall that the contemporary Court acknowledges
Congress’s plenary power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause and, simultaneously, infused the Tenth Amendment
(establishing that state civil rights commission violated cakeshop owner’s right to be free from
decisions that are hostile to his religious beliefs when he refused to design a cake for a same-sex
couple).
319. See supra notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
320. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
321. See id. at 518.
322. See supra Section III.B.3.c.ii.
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with articulable and limiting principles that protect state sovereignty as
analyzed in Parts I and II. Thus, “plenary” is not a limitless standard.
iii. Zone 3: Article I Legislation and the Circling-Back Phenomenon
What about Zone 3 and Article I legislation? Sometimes the
underlying federal statute in which Congress tries to abrogate a state’s
sovereign immunity is enacted under both Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is why this Article describes the imaginary target
with three zones; Zone 3 represents legislation enacted under Article I.323
This is true, for example, of the FMLA, the ADEA, and the ADA. With
such legislation, the Test is still relevant only to Zones 1 and 2, which
pertain to the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Zone 3 is not a source
of abrogation.324 Nevertheless, Zone 3 is an extremely important space,
particularly if abrogation fails under the Fourteenth Amendment, because
that invites the Circling Back Phenomenon. Naturally, though, Zone 3
legislation also has to be a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I powers,
and, as explored in detail in Parts I and II, the contemporary Court is
protective of state sovereignty in Zone 3 as well. For example, recall that
one reason the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)325 failed
in Morrison is because violence is not an economic activity.326
4. Zone 2 is Shrinking: Three Cautionary Tales
This Part explores three brewing open questions that bear on the above
analysis, and, with time and a few more cases, it probably will be clearer
what they mean. For now, though, they serve as bellwethers of what
might lie ahead in the development of the law at the Intersection.
a. Shelby County v. Holder: The Equal Sovereignty Principle
The Court’s decision in Shelby County significantly reins in
Congress’s enforcement power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which portends that perhaps a concomitant trend is brewing under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Recall that the Shelby County Court struck
down the preclearance formula in the 1965 VRA, which, at the time,
applied to nine states that Congress had found had a history and pattern
323. With respect to Congress’s Article I powers, in fact, the federal target consists only of
Zone 3, and, if Congress creates an individually enforceable right in that space, it is only a
statutory right. Statutory rights are enforceable under § 1983, but that is beyond the scope of this
Article. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. There is no abrogation in any event under
Seminole Tribe. See supra text accompanying notes 148–58.
324. See supra Part II.
325. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
326. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604–05, 613 (2000).
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of violating the voting rights of African Americans.327 In the 1960s,
because of the unique circumstances and widespread racial inequality in
voting, the Court held that there was no doubt that Congress was justified
in using its enforcement power to protect the voting rights of African
Americans.328 The Court held that Congress’s use of the old formula
violated the equal sovereignty principle.329 This principle protects the
equal dignity of states and requires Congress to justify its disparate
treatment of states.330 The VRA cases also refer to this principle, but note
that it applies in the context of admitting states to the Union on an equal
basis.331 The Shelby County Court used it in a different context332 and
held that the use of the “old” formula did not adequately take into account
all of the positive changes that have occurred since the 1960s.333
In contrast, § 5 legislation, consistent with meeting the Test, is not
meant to sweep up all states in its enforcement arms; it is supposed to
target only those states that have a history and pattern of constitutional
violations.334 In fact, because of RFRA’s “sweeping coverage” in
Boerne,335 the Court created the Test, but the scope of its coverage
continues to be an issue. For example, the Morrison Court was concerned
that the VAWA applied to all states.336 Simultaneously, the Hibbs Court
held that FMLA’s requirement that all states provide a minimum of
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for family care met the Test,337 but the
dissent strongly objected to applying this requirement to all states and not

327. Those nine states included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Virginia, and parts of North Carolina and Arizona. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537
(2013). For a persuasive argument that the Shelby County Court changed the prior understanding
of the equal sovereignty principle that dealt with admission of new states to the Union to now
limit Congress’s power to target legislation only at states that engage in bad behavior, see Litman,
supra note 16, at 1211. For a perspective on why allowing targeted legislation promotes
federalism and does not violate the equal sovereignty principle if adequately justified, see Thomas
B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1169–70 (2016).
328. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966) (“[E]xceptional conditions
can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”).
329. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 551.
330. Id. at 544 (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious
operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.” (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559, 580 (1911))). The Shelby County Court noted that the Coyle Court “explained that our
Nation ‘was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.’” Id. (quoting Coyle,
221 U.S. at 567).
331. See id.
332. Litman, supra note 16, at 1261–63.
333. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 547.
334. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
335. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516, 532 (1997) (holding that RFRA applied to
all states and local governments).
336. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000).
337. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724, 740 (2003).
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just offending ones.338 Interestingly, though, the § 5 cases were decided
before Shelby County and none of them rest on Congress violating or not
violating the equal sovereignty principle. Indeed, the principle is never
mentioned in the cases—not even in those cases that raise questions about
whether the underlying legislation should apply to all or only offending
states.
Simultaneously, the § 5 cases either cite to the VRA cases or make an
explicit analogy to those cases and the constitutionality of the 1965 VRA
as the Court evaluates the constitutionality of the underlying enforcement
legislation before it.339 The VRA Court held that Congress’s enforcement
power is measured by McCulloch (plenary)340 and that the
“appropriateness” of Congress’s enforcement power under both § 2 and
§ 5 is measured by the same standard.341 Quite significantly, the Court
also held that “[t]he basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express
powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States.”342
The Court then quoted the famous McCulloch “let the end be legitimate”
standard, and held that Congress’s enforcement power is as broad as its
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.343
In this way, Shelby County indicates that it almost does not matter
whether Congress’s enforcement power under § 5 is remedial or plenary
because sovereignty principles, including the equal sovereignty principle,
will immunize states from enforcement legislation under both § 2 and § 5
except, perhaps, in the most unique circumstances. How unique? The
suggestion is the circumstances needed to justify enforcement legislation
338. Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional violation that is a prerequisite to
‘prophylactic’ congressional action to ‘enforce’ the Fourteenth Amendment is a violation by the
State against which the enforcement action is taken.”); id. at 755 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The
scheme enacted by the Act does not respect the States’ autonomous power to design their own
social benefits regime.”).
339. See id. at 737–38 (majority opinion); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80–81
(2002); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
340. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
341. Id. at 325–27 (“It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated
to make the [Civil War] amendments fully effective.” (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879))). The South Carolina Court went on to note that the same
standard even applies to Congress’s enforcement power under the Eighteenth Amendment
(prohibition). Id. at 327.
342. Id. at 326.
343. Id. at 326–27 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” (emphasis
added) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421)); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (quoting and relying on the same language).
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would have to be as exceptionally dire as those that existed when the
VRA was enacted in 1965.344
Again, this observation brings to mind the suggestion that perhaps the
Court is functioning as if current relationships between the states and
individuals are more like they were at the time of Barron, meaning states
can be trusted again.345 Certainly, as the Court continues to rein in
Congress’s enforcement powers, it only makes for a stronger case that
state remedies should play a bigger role at the Intersection.
b. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland: Does Zone 1B Matter?
In 2012 in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,346 the Court
held that the self-care provision under the FMLA did not meet the Test347
(unlike the family and medical care provision in Hibbs348). Mr. Coleman,
an employee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, argued that he was
discriminated against because of his sex when he was not given sick
leave, but the Court found “scant evidence in the legislative history of a
purported stereotype harbored by employers that women take self-care
leave more than men.”349 It is not clear whether the self-care provision of
the FMLA in Coleman failed abrogation because it was not congruent
and proportional to remedying sex discrimination (Zone 1B) or because
it was not congruent and proportional to remedying disability
discrimination (due to illness) (Zone 1A). The Court was persuaded that
Congress enacted the self-care provision based on “a concern for the
economic burdens on the employee and the employee’s family resulting
from illness-related job loss and a concern for discrimination on the basis
344. The late Justice Scalia opined in his dissenting opinion in Lane, in fact, that the Test
should apply only in race discrimination cases and added that the “necessary and proper” standard
would be the correct measurement in such cases. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 563–64 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In many ways, Justice Scalia’s suggestion would bring clarity to the Test
because Zone 2 would exist only for race discrimination. However, caution would be called for
to avoid the collapsible error. See generally Rush, supra note 231 (describing and exploring the
collapsible error).
345. Many people, especially people of color, would argue that states still cannot be trusted
with certain equality issues, particularly racial equality issues. Ironically, although society has
made significant progress in race relations, there is still much to be done. See generally MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev.
ed. 2012) (arguing that mass incarceration in the United States is a continued form of racial
control). The “return to a Barron-like time” observation, sadly, has more than just a ring of truth
to it: it also has a deeply unjust element of truth to it that is all too easily masked behind the
positive guidelines many people think the contemporary Court has contributed to federalism in
light of its jurisprudence at the Intersection.
346. 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
347. Id. at 43–44 (plurality opinion).
348. See supra notes 276–83 and accompanying text.
349. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 34–35, 37, 38 (plurality opinion).
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of illness, not sex,”350 suggesting it was in Zone 1A. Throughout the
opinion, though, the Court does not say what level of the review the
purported constitutional right is entitled to, although the opinion does
center on refuting the claim that Mr. Coleman was discriminated against
based on sex.351
If Coleman is interpreted as a disability discrimination case in Zone
1A, Congress could not produce evidence that states are irrationally
discriminating against people with disabilities in providing sick leave and
that is why abrogation failed. If, on the other hand, it was decided as a
sex discrimination case in Zone 1B, which is the stronger argument, then
Coleman is a more significant decision because abrogation failed to meet
the Test in a case involving a heightened review standard. The dissenting
Justices in Coleman—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan—were strongly persuaded of the evidence that showed the selfcare provision was likely to prevent sex discrimination.352 In fact, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent picked up on this very point and opined that
“Congress homed in on gender discrimination, which triggers heightened
review,” and quoted Hibbs, “‘[I]t was [therefore] easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.’”353 Justice Ginsburg,
joined by the other dissenting Justices, thought the Court should have
given greater deference to Congress.354
It is significant, though, that Hibbs was decided by a 6–3 vote, with
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in the dissent.355 By the time
Coleman was decided nine years later, Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Souter, and Stevens were no longer on the Court356 and they, along with
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, had been the majority in Hibbs.357 In
contrast, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 5–4 opinion in Coleman,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.358
The changes in the Court’s composition between Hibbs and Coleman
might explain the different outcomes given the Justices’ overall
350. Id. at 38.
351. Id. at 42–43.
352. Id. at 62 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 64 (alteration in original) (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 736 (2003)).
354. Id. at 65. In Boerne, the Court opined that the legislative record is not determinative in
evaluating the constitutionality of enforcement legislation. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
531 (1997) (“Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record
Congress compiles but ‘on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to
decide.’” (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part))).
355. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723.
356. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 32.
357. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723.
358. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 32.
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jurisprudence in this area. It also indicates that the Roberts Court might
be taking a tougher stance on whether abrogation is valid, and this would
be consistent with fortifying the Shield and protecting state sovereignty.
Remember that many of the federalism cases are 5–4 decisions.359
c. Zone 3 and The Circling-Back Phenomenon: The Scope of
Congress’s Power
From a broader perspective, recall that one of the open issues about
the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power—even though the
definition is the same today as it was at the time of McCulloch—is
whether Congress needs to produce actual evidence that an economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce or whether Congress’s
judgment merely has to be rational.360 This mirrors the similar issue
dividing the Justices about Congress’s § 5 power and the degree of
deference the Court will give to Congress in enacting enforcement
legislation. Should the deferential standard be the same? Although it is
logical for it to be harder for Congress to meet the Test in the rational
basis review space, applying the same “actual” evidence standard that is
being applied in the Commerce Clause context seems too harsh, although
it does fortify the Shield.
Moreover, if Coleman is interpreted to mean that the Court is reining
in Congress even in Zone 1B, then applying the “actual” evidence
standard in that space indeed proves too much. It essentially takes the
“remedial” standard to mean only “remedial” and not also “preventive.”
This interpretation effectively eliminates Zone 2 on the imaginary federal
target. Notably, mathematical models facilitate measuring the
quantitative impacts of economic regulations under the Commerce
Clause, but quantitative measurements of the harmful effects of
stereotyping and other ways in which discrimination can impact an
individual’s life are only beginning to be developed in the social
sciences.361 But because it is harder to measure discrimination does not
mean that it is not real or that individuals do not suffer real consequences
as victims.
359. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000). Justice Kennedy’s
retirement is unlikely to affect the voting balance because he was not a consequential “swing
vote” in most federalism cases. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 723.
360. See supra Section I.C.2.b. Justice Breyer raised this in Garrett, in which he said: “In
my view, Congress reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an
‘appropriate’ way to enforce this basic equal protection requirement. And that is all the
Constitution requires.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
361. See, e.g., Katherine Picho & Scott W. Brown, Can Stereotype Threat Be Measured? A
Validation of the Social Identities and Attitude Scale (SIAS), 22 J. ADVANCED ACADS. 374, 405–
06 (2011).
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For example, social science data is bringing to bear the importance of
acknowledging the phenomenon such as “unconscious bias.”362 Indeed,
many businesses engaged in commerce are beginning to require their
employees to undertake “implicit bias” training as part of their “best
business practices.”363 It would be ironic—and almost unbelievable—if
the Court gave just as much, if not more deference to Article I legislation,
which is designed to prevent discrimination in private commercial
relationships (such as Ollie’s Barbeque), as § 5 legislation, which is
designed to prevent the state from violating individuals’ Fourteenth
Amendment liberties. This understanding is part of the federalism
balance under the Commerce Clause, but it ignores the history and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to protect individuals. The
Boerne Court, in adopting the Test, held that “[j]udicial deference, in
most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record Congress
compiles but ‘on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
appointed to decide.’”364 This weighs in favor of giving at least as much
deference to Congress under § 5, particularly in Zone 1B and Zone 2
cases, as the Court does under the Commerce Clause, especially with
respect to the explicit and unique role Congress has to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals.
To briefly summarize, the Shield and the Void are persuasive
evidence that one of the Court’s most important concerns is protecting
state sovereignty. This is not to say that the contemporary Court is not
concerned about individual rights. In support of individual rights, it has
held that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is an individual

362. See generally Bornstein, supra note 286 (discussing unconscious bias issues in
employment decisions); Nance, supra note 286 (discussing unconscious bias issues for
implementing school safety measures).
363. A recent example is apparent by Starbucks’s response to the racial incident when a
white employee called the police and had two black men arrested because they were waiting in
the store for a friend and were not ordering anything. See Rachel Siegel & Alex Horton, Starbucks
to Close 8,000 Stores for Racial-Bias Education on May 29 After Arrest of Two Black Men, WASH.
POST (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/17/star
bucks-to-close-8000-stores-for-racial-bias-education-on-may-29-after-arrest-of-two-black-men/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e4b88084369a [https://perma.cc/4R33-SLU2]. Starbucks closed all
of its businesses on May 29, 2018, and required its 175,000 employees to engage in “racial bias
training.” See Rachel Siegel, Here’s What to Expect from Today’s Starbucks Racial Bias Training,
WASH. POST (May 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/23/
not-who-we-aspire-to-be-starbucks-previews-next-weeks-racial-bias-training-for-8000-employ
ees/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.922f9c829478 [https://perma.cc/LGL4-K9RD].
364. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Justice Scalia’s view
was to give deference using the Necessary and Proper Clause standard for legislation that applies
to only offending states and state actors. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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right365 and incorporated the Amendment to apply to the states.366 It also
held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.367
Nevertheless, it is a fair observation that the Court thinks that times have
changed and that Congress’s enforcement power need not be as broad as
it was either at the time the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification or at the
time of the Second Reconstruction. Moreover, reasonable people agree
that the law must evolve, presupposing that it will inevitably change over
time.368 Recall that “changing times” was the rationale for the Shelby
County Court’s decision to strike down Congress’s continued use of the
“old” coverage formula in the VRA.369
Nevertheless, individuals who are harmed by unlawful state action
deserve remedies. Strengthening the Shield to protect states and leaving
individuals vulnerable to falling into the Void is inconsistent with both
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to protect individuals—and
the importance of states. It would be enormously significant and
consistent with the modern Court’s message about the importance of
states if the Court could also provide guidance on the role of states in
protecting the rights of individuals.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE REMEDIES IN THE
FEDERALISM BALANCE
A. Section 1983 and Monroe v. Pape: Modifying the Message
Realistically, given the contemporary Court’s jurisprudence at the
Intersection, perhaps it is time to focus on the importance of state
remedies under the Fourteenth Amendment and there is evidence that the
Court is beginning to do that.370 Admittedly, such a message would
necessitate a retreat from the Court’s long-standing message—since
1961—in Monroe v. Pape371 that the availability of state remedies is

365. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
366. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
367. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
368. For an excellent analysis of why there can be no definitive “equilibrium” point in the
federalism balance, see generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005).
See also id. at 1749–51 (“The Constitution’s extended existence over time, moreover, requires
adjustment and adaptation to new circumstances. Indeed, the most likely explanation for
constitutional ambiguity on federalism, to my mind, is that it represents a deliberate strategy on
the part of the Framers to allow the mechanics of federalism to be worked out and adapted through
practice over time . . . .”).
369. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547, 553 (2013).
370. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 644 n.9 (1999).
371. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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irrelevant in § 1983 cases.372 In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police
officers373 unlawfully entered the Monroes’ home without a warrant in
violation of their federal and state rights and “routed them from bed,
made them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room,
emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers.”374 They also unlawfully
detained Mr. Monroe and interrogated him for ten hours and never
charged him with a crime.375 The Monroes sued under § 1983376 for
damages even though they could have sued in Illinois state court for
violation of their state rights and received adequate remedies.377 In
holding that state remedies are irrelevant, the Court said that “[i]t is no
answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”378
The Monroe Court’s message is not surprising given that it was
decided during the 1960s Civil Rights movement. By the time Monroe
was decided, Barron’s holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states379 was long gone,380 and today most of the rights have been
incorporated.381 Interestingly but not surprisingly, the most active period
of incorporation was in the 1960s—the second Reconstruction period—
when the Court incorporated ten rights in the Bill of Rights.382 Both the
372. Id. at 183.
373. The city of Chicago, not the state of Illinois, was named as a defendant, along with the
police officers. See id. at 169–70. The Monroe Court held that cities and local governments were
not “persons” under § 1983. Id. at 191 & n.50. However, the Court reversed this decision in Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 663, but also held in Monell that to sue a local
government for money damages, the plaintiff must show the local state actors acted pursuant to
an invalid policy. Id. at 690.
374. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
375. Id.
376. See id. at 168.
377. Id. at 195 (Harlan, J., concurring). The idea that a state can provide “adequate” remedies
suggests that a wrong committed under state law is just as heinous as a wrong committed under
federal law, including the Constitution. This is debatable, of course. Nevertheless, being able to
get damages under state law might adequately redress the tangible injuries—medical cost, lost
wages, and so forth. Certainly, being able to recover damages under state law is far better than
not being able to recover them at all because of the Shield and the Void.
378. Id. at 183 (majority opinion).
379. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
380. For example, the Court incorporated the right to compensation for property taken by the
government in 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236
(1897), and the right to free speech in 1925 in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
381. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean & Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine
Sch. of Law, The Jury Trial and Remedy Clauses, Address at The Jury Trial and Remedy
Guarantees: Fundamental Rights or Paper Tigers? Symposium (May 1, 2017), in 96 OR. L. REV.
677, 681 (2017). The most notable exception is the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial.
See id.
382. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment
right to be free from double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
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incorporation doctrine and the Monroe Court’s holding that state
remedies are irrelevant under § 1983 are evidence that the states,
particularly at that time, were violating the very fundamental rights
embedded in the Bill of Rights that the Barron Court had protected from
federal interference. Thus, state remedies were irrelevant at that time, not
necessarily because the existence of state remedies was unimportant, but
because the federal government could not trust states to act in accordance
with the Fourteenth Amendment. And because they could not do that,
Congress needed to exercise broad enforcement power under both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.383
Modifying the Monroe message would be consistent with the
contemporary Court’s jurisprudence at the Intersection. To highlight,
since the 1960s Civil Rights movement, the contemporary Court has
revived the Tenth Amendment, infused the Eleventh Amendment with
Tenth Amendment principles, significantly curtailed Congress’s § 5 (and
§ 2) enforcement power, and narrowed its interpretation of § 1983.384 All
of these developments reflect the dawning of a new day for the
contemporary Court. In fact, the contemporary Court rationalizes reining
in Congress’s power because of changing times. This is the rationale for
its decision in Shelby County, releasing it from the preclearance provision
of the VRA.385 With the dawning of this new day, perhaps it is time to
expect more from states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Contemporary Court’s Observations About State Remedies
As the Court began to iron out its jurisprudence about Congress’s § 5
power by taking a number of cases in somewhat rapid succession after
Boerne in 1997, it also started to include observations about the existence
of state remedies. The force or weight of the Court’s observations fall
along a continuum. At one end (#1) are those § 5 cases in which the Court
(incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment confrontation
clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment right to be
free from self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)
(incorporating the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by impartial jury).
383. The late Justice Scalia emphasized this same point in his dissent in Lane. See Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 563 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
384. For example, the Court has read into § 1983 very stringent immunity defenses to protect
state actors, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Kit Kinports, The Supreme
Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016)
(summarizing the expansion of qualified immunity defenses to §1983).
385. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547, 557 (2013).
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says nothing about state remedies, and at the other end (#5) are those
cases where abrogation is successful so that state remedies are less
important because individuals avoid the Void. In between the
continuum’s end points are observations about the importance of state
remedies that vary in weight: (#2) states could or do provide remedies,
(#3) states could waive their immunity under federal law, and (#4) if
states provide a remedy, then there is no constitutional violation. Notably,
the same case can exemplify more than one observation. The important
point to take away from this analysis is this: Regardless of where a
particular case falls on the continuum, the Court’s observations do not
send a message that providing state remedies is an important contribution
to protecting individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Example of #1 (nothing about state remedies): Interestingly, the
Boerne Court, which established the Test, said nothing about the
existence of state remedies. Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however,
focused on the depth of the states’ commitment to protecting the free
exercise of religion and noted that the “remedy” for laws that unduly
burden this right was to accommodate the individual by excusing them
from the legal obligation.386 Because of that, she argued that the Court
should reconsider its decision in Smith,387 in which the Court held that
neutral laws of general applicability are constitutional if they meet the
rational basis test.388 For a state to provide a remedy when an individual
right is violated, however, would demonstrate an even deeper
commitment to protecting that right. But, again, state remedies played no
part in the very case that significantly reined in Congress’s enforcement
power.
Example of #2 (could provide or do provide remedies): The Court’s
observations in this group merely reflect the reality that states could
provide remedies and that some states in fact do provide them. For
example, in striking down the VAWA in Morrison in 2000, Chief Justice
Rehnquist ended his majority opinion with this observation:
Petitioner Brzonkala’s complaint alleges that she was the
victim of a brutal assault. But Congress’ effort . . . to provide
a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the
Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the allegations here are true, no civilized
system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy . . . . But
386. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 552–54 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“By 1789, every State but Connecticut had incorporated some version of a free exercise clause
into its constitution.”).
387. Id. at 544–45.
388. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
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under our federal system that remedy must be provided by
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United
States.389
This message about the importance of state remedies is significant,
because only the state could mitigate the Void in light of the Shield.
Shortly after Morrison, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the
Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does
not abrogate states’ immunity,390 and in Garrett, the Court held that
neither did the ADA.391 Unlike Morrison, the Kimel Court observed that
states provide remedies for age discrimination.392 Specifically, Justice
O’Connor opined that “[s]tate employees are protected by state age
discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state
employers, in almost every State of the Union.”393 The Garrett Court
noted that all states protected individuals from disability discrimination
by the time the ADA was enacted in 1990, but also noted that “[a] number
of these provisions . . . did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring
accommodation.”394 However, like the Kimel Court, the Garrett Court
did not address states’ remedial measures, and, in particular, whether
money damages were available for violations due to disability
discrimination.
When the federal Void appears as it did in Boerne, Morrison, Garrett,
and Kimel, it is significant for the Court to acknowledge that states can
or even do provide remedies. But notice that there is no “punch” behind
the Morrison Court’s’ observations. If Virginia provides a remedy, great;
it shows Virginia is “civilized” in the Court’s eyes. But it does not have
to provide a remedy and presumably the federal government could not
make Virginia provide a remedy because the anti-commandeering
principle protects Virginia’s sovereignty and sovereign immunity. And
saying nothing about the availability or unavailability of state remedies
is not a message about the importance of states.
In contrast, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Kimel is more forceful and
suggests that it is important for individuals to have the ability to seek
money damages against their states for age discrimination. Otherwise,
why include that message? Still, her opinion does not connect the absence
of federal remedies with the presence of state remedies in any analytical
389. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 627 (2000).
390. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000).
391. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
392. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91–92.
393. Id. at 91. Justice Stevens noted in his opinion that before Congress extended the ADEA
in 1974 to apply to public employers, “all 50 States had some form of age discrimination law, but
24 of them did not extend their own laws to public employers.” Id. at 94 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
394. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5.
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sense. For example, she does not say that federal remedies are
unnecessary because states provide them. Nor does she suggest, for
example, that Congress’s enforcement power might be greater or be due
greater judicial deference when states do not provide remedies. Rather,
her observation about state remedies is just that; it describes the reality.
Nevertheless, it is a more significant observation about the importance of
state remedies than that in Boerne, Morrison, or Garrett.
Example of #3 (could waive their immunity): Justice Kennedy’s
observation, writing for the majority in Coleman in 2012, exemplifies this
message. Recall that the Coleman Court struck down the self-care
provision of the FMLA because it failed congruence and
proportionality.395 This meant that the plaintiffs fell into the Void and
could not sue Maryland for money damages. Their hope to secure that
remedy had to come from Maryland. But Justice Kennedy did not simply
acknowledge that, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Morrison, or as
Justice O’Connor did in Kimel. Rather, Justice Kennedy “elbowed”
Maryland in its immunity side to suggest that the money Void is also its
responsibility to address:
Of course, a State need not assert its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suits for damages.
Discrimination against women is contrary to the public
policy of the State of Maryland and the State has conceded
that the Act is good social policy. If the State agrees with
petitioner that damages liability for violations of the selfcare provision is necessary to combat discrimination against
women, the State may waive its immunity or create a parallel
state-law cause of action.396
This message is definitely more forceful than any of the ones
mentioned. But, again, in none of these cases, with the possible exception
of Coleman explored more fully in #4 below, does the Court engage in
any critical analysis about the role states could play in remedying
Fourteenth Amendment violations and how that possibility would affect
Congress’s enforcement power. For example, if states willingly waive
their sovereign immunity, there would be less cause for concern about the
federal remedy Void. And if states do not provide a remedy, then there
also should be less concern about protecting state sovereignty, and
concomitantly, less concern about giving greater deference to Congress
when it enacts enforcement legislation. To be sure, the Court’s
observations that an individual’s only recourse to secure a remedy for
wrongful state action might be under the individual’s state laws is
395. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
396. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 41 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
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somewhat of a recognition that the individual should have a remedy. And
if it is not forthcoming because of the Shield and Void, then why not
expect it to come from the states? At least engaging the complexities of
the consequences of the Shield and the Void to the individual, while
simultaneously promoting the importance of states, would add legitimacy
to the recent developments at the Intersection.
Example of #4 (if they do provide, then no constitutional violation):
This observation is important because it explicitly links state remedies
and constitutional violations. Specifically, in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,397
College Savings Bank sued the state of Florida under the Patent Remedy
Act (PRA)398 for patent infringement. The PRA was enacted under both
Article I and § 5 and it included a clear statement of intent to abrogate
states’ immunity.399 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
held that the PRA failed the Test because “Congress identified no pattern
of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations.”400 Not only was there virtually no evidence of patent
infringement by the states, there was even evidence that “states are
willing and able to respect patent rights.”401 Importantly, the Court held
that if states provide a remedy, as Florida did,402 then there is no
constitutional violation at all.403 Without a constitutional violation, of
course, an individual does not even have a federal case and the Void is
irrelevant.
The Court’s message in Florida Prepaid about state remedies is
dramatically different from a more general message about the availability
of state remedies when the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated.
Florida Prepaid fits into a line of cases that makes the availability of
adequate state remedies a decisive factor in deciding whether certain due
process rights have been violated.404 Certainly, in thinking about the
397. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
398. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 66 Stat. 811 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)),
invalidated by Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627.
399. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36.
400. Id. at 546, 640.
401. Id. at 640–41 (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 56 (1990) (statement of William S. Thompson, President, American
Intellectual Property Law Association)).
402. Id. at 644 n.9.
403. Id. at 643 (“[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies,
to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property without
due process result.”).
404. This line of cases begins with Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), a case involving a prisoner’s lost hobby kit. Id. at 529.
Briefly, while Mr. Taylor was in segregation, prison officials negligently misplaced a hobby kit
he had ordered. Id. at 530. Taylor sued under § 1983 alleging that his property had been taken
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contours of what it might mean for state remedies to be available at the
Intersection—the focus of future scholarship—this is one possible
view.405 Moreover, it is a view that is consistent with protecting
federalism, because Florida Prepaid did not hold that states have to
provide remedies.406 And the anti-commandeering principle presumably
prevents the federal government from requiring states to provide one.407
All Florida Prepaid held is that if states do provide one, then there is no
constitutional violation. And the options for remedies are as diverse as
the states, eliminating any suggestion that states are compelled to provide
certain remedies or else. If Congress can successfully manage federal
regulatory schemes with the states’ cooperative participation under
Article I’s respect for the “labs of experimentation” principle, it also can
respect varying state remedies—something it already does. For example,
some states waive their immunity in certain cases and other states do not.
This is in-keeping with Dean Gerken’s and other scholars’ observations
that federal–state relations are much more interwoven in today’s modern
world. Thus, a state’s sovereignty is not impugned when Congress enacts
legislation to keep individuals from falling into the Void by providing
federal remedies, including money damages, when states have chosen not
to provide their own remedies.
Flip the Florida Prepaid coin, however, and Coleman comes up again.
One line in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Coleman deserves
mention. Specifically, with respect to the validity of the self-care
provision of FMLA under § 5, Justice Kennedy quotes Florida Prepaid
and stresses that “Congress . . . said nothing about the existence or
adequacy of state remedies.”408 Linking Coleman, which arguably is
more like Hibbs (FMLA and sex discrimination) but results in a decision
that is more like Garrett (ADA and disability discrimination), with
without due process. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that because the state
provided a post-deprivation remedy, Taylor did not suffer a constitutional violation. Id. at 543–
44. Similarly, Florida Prepaid did not take College Savings Bank’s property when it infringed its
patent because Florida provided an adequate remedy. Understandably, in cases like Parratt where
the state actor’s conduct is random and unauthorized, only a post-deprivation remedy is possible.
405. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 114–15, 138–39 (1990) (holding, for a due process claim, that the state could not escape
liability by claiming their conduct was random and unpredictable so that all the process the
plaintiff could be due is a post-deprivation damages remedy).
406. For a persuasive argument that the “right to a remedy” should be a fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution (as it is in most states), see Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort
Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 975, 977 (2006).
407. But see ARAIZA, supra note 9, at 4 (questioning whether the anti-commandeering
principle applies).
408. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 39 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 644 (1999)).
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Florida Prepaid is curious because Florida Prepaid is radically different
from all of the § 5 cases. But this observation should be taken quite
seriously because it was followed with this observation: “It follows that
abrogating the States’ immunity from suits for damages for failure to give
self-care leave is not a congruent and proportional remedy if existing state
leave policies would have sufficed.”409
Is the Court suggesting that the existence of state remedies means that
congruence and proportionality can never be met? Stated alternatively,
does it mean that Congress has no enforcement power if states provide a
remedy? Not even for actual violations? In Florida Prepaid, of course,
the existence of state remedies meant there was not even a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. The Coleman opinion does not go that far, and the
full import of this observation needs to be explored.
Example of #5 (successful abrogation): Congress successfully
abrogated states’ immunity in Hibbs and Lane, but neither majority
opinion addressed state remedies. It is possible for states to provide
remedies and for Congress also to provide a remedy. This was the
situation in Monroe, in fact.410 And even if the Monroe message were to
be modified to express the importance of state remedies, such a shift
would not necessarily mean that state remedies would supplant federal
remedies. Still, the curious Coleman message that needs greater
exploration raises this possibility.
From the bigger picture perspective, as important as state sovereignty
and state sovereign immunity are, it simply violates the spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment to shield states from injuries they cause by
allowing victims of state-action wrongdoing to fall into the Void. When
states do protect individuals, they deserve recognition for that.
Additionally, a message from the Court about the importance of state
remedies would support its jurisprudence at the Intersection and even
strengthen it by encouraging and perhaps even expecting states to play a
significant role in protecting the important principles embedded in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores how the contemporary Court interprets Article I
and the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to protect
sovereignty and federalism principles. The contemporary Court is
providing meaningful and substantive guidance with respect to drawing
the boundary between Congress and the states, particularly with respect
to Congress’s Article I powers. Perhaps the most curious part of this area
of jurisprudence is that the Eleventh Amendment, despite the havoc it has
409. Id.
410. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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wreaked, nevertheless serves its purpose, which is reflected in the broader
Tenth Amendment principles. The Tenth Amendment is a truism, but the
current substantive meaning behind it reveals what a truism it is!
With respect to drawing the boundary among Congress, the states, and
the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Shield and
the Void loom large. Accordingly, the contemporary Court’s resurgence
of and emphasis on state sovereignty are an invitation to explore the
positive role states can and should play in protecting individual rights. A
message from the Court in support of this invitation would be consistent
with, and even fortify, its overall message about the importance of states
in the constitutional design. The late Justice Brennan, a self-avowed
supporter of federalism, also believed that states play an everincreasingly important role in protecting human liberty, particularly as it
becomes more difficult to secure federal remedies. In his words: “[T]he
very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a
clear call to [the] state[s] . . . to step into the breach.”411 For those who
strongly support state sovereignty, and for those who strongly support
individual liberties, this Article suggests that both goals can be met if the
Court develops jurisprudence about the positive role of states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

411. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503. Justice Brennan was talking specifically about the role
of state courts in interpreting state constitutions to protect human liberty. This Article calls on
states to exercise their various powers—legislative, judicial, executive—to mitigate the federal
Void.
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